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 The main object of this research is to estimate a time series for the total and unit 
value of in-ground proved oil reserves and natural gas reserves in the United States.  
There are good official statistics of the physical quantities.  Our task has been primarily 
to estimate the in-ground unit values.  Total in-ground value equals quantity times unit 
value. 
 
 Such a series has several uses.  First, it provides information about the national 
income and wealth, which includes mineral reserves.  About 70 percent of mineral value-
added in 1997 was oil and natural gas. [Census Bureau: Manufacturing & Mining]  Some 
such proportion governs mineral wealth in the ground.  The U.S. Government itself owns 
land that includes large reserves.  The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) has deplored 
the lack of reserve price data.  They are estimated here.2  
 
 Second, there is much interest, when calculating national income and product, to 
make full allowance for current consumption of minerals.  If the oil and gas reserve 
values are known, capital consumption of minerals is the difference in reserve value from 
the beginning to the end of the period.  This difference can then be partitioned into the 
difference in physical amount held and the difference in the unit value. 
 
 Third, there is much interest in the condition of the oil and gas industries in the 
United States.  The value of an in-ground unit (compared with its reproduction cost) is 
the crucial fact.  Unfortunately, we can no longer make this comparison.  Since 1991, 
there has been no compilation of capital expenditures for finding and developing 
hydrocarbons, formerly published (API 1983-1991; Census ASOG 1973-1982; see 
                                                 
1 The authors are especially grateful to Jie Yang for her skillful and devoted research assistance.  We thank 
Andre Plourde, James Smith and Ralph Kimball for valuable suggestions and comments on an earlier draft. 
2 This paper is in part a sequel to an earlier effort: Adelman & Watkins [1996]. 
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Adelman [1992, pp. 19-20]).  Information from the Department of Energy is not a 
substitute, since it is based on a partial and unrepresentative sample, omitting much of 
relevance.  
 
 Fourth, reserve values have important implications for the basic theory of mineral 
resources, with which we start. 
 
 Our report is organized in six main sections.  Section I discusses mineral resource 
theory in the context of information reserve prices might provide. Section II reviews the 
basic data used to estimate reserve prices. The results of reserve price estimation – both 
from regression analysis and other sources – are presented and discussed in Section III. 
Section IV concerns the calculation of Hotelling Values, implicit price expectations 
embedded in reserve prices, and returns to holding reserves.  Section V applies our 
estimates of in-ground reserve prices to value US oil and gas reserves. Concluding 
remarks are made in Section VI.  Four Appendices provide full details. 
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I. Mineral Resource Theory – Pertinent Issues 
 
 Here we discuss salient theoretical issues relating to mineral resources on which 
reserve price data potentially shed some light. These include resource scarcity, past 
information on reserve values, the definition of reserves, and the notion of shifts in 
supply curves.  In so doing we anticipate certain results that appear later on in the paper.  
 
1. Mineral Values and Limited Resources 
 
 Minerals have long been considered as peculiar resources, being sooner or 
ultimately doomed to disappear.  A bundle of quite recent books and articles foresee an 
end to oil production looming.3  The President of the Institute of Petroleum in London 
sums up: oil and gas production is unsustainable.  He thinks half the original endowment 
has already been produced, and in 10 years annual production “must” decline.  (Oil & 
Gas Journal, March 3, 2003, p. 28)  We have heard this refrain for over 100 years, 
starting in 1875, in Rockefeller’s day [Chernow 1998, pp. 102, 197], during which time 
the production of oil has multiplied by a factor of over 1000.  These kinds of forecasts are 
unaffected by factual evidence.  From time to time the resource estimates are revised, but 
never the theory and predictions.  There is no need to: since the Earth is finite, any subset 
is also finite.  At any consumption rate the subset must in time disappear.  The 
hydrocarbon stock is there from the start, and must finally be consumed.  No economic 
process enters: no prices to govern supply and demand, or to guide investment. 
 
 The economic way of thinking appears in Jevons’ pioneer if flawed 1865 study of 
British coal [Jevons 1865].  He repudiated the idea of a fixed underground stock, but 
forecast rising real marginal cost and ultimate decline.  British coal production did indeed 
decline after 1913, and what little remains today is largely subsidized.  But there was 
never any resource exhaustion.  Untold billions of tons remain in the ground today, 
                                                 
3 Richard A. Kerr, “The Next Oil Crisis Looms Large—and Perhaps Close”, Science, August 1998, pp. 
1128-1130. See also J. J. MacKenzie, “Oil as a Finite Resource: When is Global Production Likely to 
Peak?” World Resources Institute (Washington, D. C.), March 1996. Petroconsultant writings:  Colin J. 
Campbell and Jean H. Laherrere,  “The End of Cheap Oil”, Scientific American, March 1998, pp. 78-83;  
Colin J. Campbell, “Oil Price Leap in the Nineties”, Noroil December 1989. Letter to London Economist 
August 6, 1994. On the Petroconsultant-predicted 2000 peak and   price shock: Oil & Gas Journal, October 
20, 1986, p. 22.  Hence the European Union (and others) plan for renewables: Oil & Gas Journal May 17, 
1999, p. 4.   See also K. S. Deffeyes, Hubbert’s Peak: the Impending World Oil Shortage, Princeton 
University Press 2001.  See, however, the October 1 release by HIS (successor to Petroconsultants): “…the 
combination of reserve revisions and new discoveries has exceeded global oil demand over the past ten 
years.” 
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untouched because current investment and extraction costs are too high compared with 
foreign coal, not to speak of oil, natural gas and nuclear power. 
 
 Economic analysis has always recognized that coming events cast their shadows 
before, through discounting.  If the stock is limited¸ then even a low rate of its 
disappearance constantly reduces its amount and raises its price.  The theory was worked 
out in the classic paper of Hotelling [1931].  He proved that if firms were competitive and 
profit-seeking, each unit of the fixed stock must at any moment have the same present 
value as any other, regardless of how soon any particular unit was to be produced.  
Arbitrage would erase any difference.  Three testable hypotheses followed.  (H1) At any 
moment, the value of a unit in-ground equals its net field price, i.e. its gross price less 
current outlays.  (H2) Over time, the in-ground value must increase at a rate equal to the 
return on assets of comparable risk.  (H3) At a given moment, the speed with which a 
given deposit is exhausted has no effect on its present value, because the price rises with 
the discount rate. 
 
 In 1931, little or no empirical data existed to confirm or refute the paradigm of 
constantly increasing net price and in-ground value (H2).  Changes in gross spot prices, 
of the mineral emerging from the earth, were the first object of study.  Potter and Christy 
[1962] showed that gross minerals prices had if anything decreased over the longer run.  
Many such studies later appeared.  Tilton [2003, chapter 4] thought there had apparently 
been no general increase, but pointed to the difficulties of deflating the price series to get 
real price changes. 
 
 Gordon [1967] was one of the first to question the Hotelling paradigm of values 
and net prices rising.  In his view, mineral industries were not behaving as they “should”.  
Adelman [1970] doubted the distinction between mineral and non-mineral industries.  
But particularly after the price exploded in 1973-74 and in 1979, economic opinion ran 
strongly the other way.  ([Solow 1974], [Stiglitz 1976], [DasGupta & Heal 1979], [Gately 
1984], [Miller & Upton 1985], [Arrow 1987]).  Many economists called the price 
increases the necessary effect of limited reserves, and some predicted field prices above 
$100 per barrel, arriving before the year 2000.  
 
2. Earlier Data on North American Oil and Gas Reserve Values 
 
 There have long been many owners of producing properties, and many sales of in-
ground reserves.  The industry’s working ‘rule’ or approximation has long been: gross 
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field price is about three times the reserve value.  Moreover, net field price was around 
two-thirds of gross, in a quite stable proportion (API 1983-1991; Census ASOG 1972-
1982).  Subtracting out one-third of the field price to allow for current outlays left the net 
price at double the reserve value, far above equality.  Cairns and Davis [2001] found 
support for this rule. 
 
 Some engineering studies done in the 1950s confirmed the approximation of 
reserve values as one-third gross prices. They also showed that the more quickly the 
reserve was to be exhausted, the greater was its market value. [T.C. Frick and R.W. 
Taylor, eds, Petroleum Production Handbook, McGraw-Hill 1962, relevant sections in 
Bradley (ed) 1987, chs 40-41]  Thus industry practice was in conflict with two Hotelling 
paradigms: H1 and H3.  First, net in-ground values were about half (or the industry 
paradigm, one-third) of what they “should be”.  Second, present value depends partly on 
how near is the time when a barrel is scheduled to be drawn out of the earth.  In theory, 
there should be no such relation.  Watkins [1992] asked how the industry could thus 
ignore what seemed like a basic and favorable rule: that the net price had to rise at the 
current discount rate.  Conversely, he asked, how could economists ignore what industry 
was actually doing? 
 
 Starting with 1946, per-barrel values of in-ground oil reserves were estimated, for 
many producing corporations, by the John S. Herold Company.  Methods of estimation 
were not explained.  However, the estimates continued to be updated and sold, a market 
test at least of their acceptability.  One of the present authors participated in a study of 
these values for 1946-1986 (Adelman, DeSilva & Koehn [1991]).  After eliminating 1946 
and 1947 because of small samples (16 and 7 respectively), in every year the average 
field net price exceeded the annual average in-ground value plus at least one standard 
deviation.  In 32 of the 39 years the net field price exceeded the average reserve value 
plus two or more standard deviations.  Similar results were recorded in Adelman and 
Watkins [1996]. 
 
3. The Meaning and Valuation of “Reserves” 
 
 Reserves are defined and explained in the engineering handbooks [Frick, Bradley] 
as the end-product of development investment.  The plan for any proposed well is that it 
will if drilled produce a given amount in the initial year, declining at a roughly constant 
percentage rate each following year, unless there were further investment in pressure 
maintenance, for example. The diminishing flow is reckoned as continuing as long as the 
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net price is positive, i.e. as long as the value of the well’s output at least exceeds its 
current costs.  When net price goes to zero, the “economic limit” has been reached and 
production ceases.  The oil or gas still left in the ground (usually much more than what 
has been produced) is not counted.  But improved technology, making the previously 
uneconomic now profitable, in the same or other reservoirs, would increase reserves. 
 
 Oil in “non-producing reservoirs” is not in the US totals because these reservoirs 
are an interim or transitory class: “those waiting for well workovers, drilling additional 
development or replacement wells, installing production or pipeline facilities, and 
awaiting…recompletion in reservoirs not currently open to production.” (EIA Reserves, 
p. 24).  U.S. Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquids Reserves, 2000 Annual 
Report, December 2001, p. 24]  These “reserves” are excluded from national totals, until 
the investment has been completed. 
 
 Whether a proposed well or production project will be undertaken, and reserves 
created, depends on estimated revenues versus costs, and therefore upon estimated 
present values.  If the net present value of the proposed output, net of operating cost, is 
less than the required investment, the well is not drilled.  If delay would increase present 
value, drilling will be delayed, and there is as yet no creation of new reserves. 
 
 Thus the reserve is the estimated cumulative production from capacity already in 
place, as calculated by engineers and accepted by investors.  Let Q be initial output, 
continuing over time until point T.  In a reservoir, or for all taken together, the reserve is 
the area under the curve, and the decline rate is current output divided by the reserve:   
 
 R = ∫T
0
Qe-atdt       (1). 
 
 If T runs to infinity, we have: 
   
 a=Q/R        (2) 
 
i.e. the decline rate is initial output divided by the reserve.  We list in Section III the 
following approximation: 
 
 V = Pa/(a+i-g)       (3) 
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where: V is the reserve price 
i is the discount rate on hydrocarbon reserves or production 
g is the expected annual increase in the net price P embedded in the reserve price, 
V.4 
 
 This is a more general form of the basic Hotelling equality.  That is, if net price 
rises at the discount rate, i, then g = i, and (3) collapses to V = P.  Or, if we could 
establish by independent evidence that V=P, then it would follow that g = i.  But the 
Hotelling equality V=P has thus far been refuted by the evidence, including evidence 
presented later in this paper. 
 
Let us now assume that i>g, so that (i-g) is always positive.  Then V/P should be 
an increasing function of ‘a’, at a decreasing rate.  The engineering studies bear this out 
(Bradley¸ op cit).  Moreover, since all variables but g are exogenous one can calculate g 
from them: 
 
 g = i + a [1- (P/V)]      (4). 
 
The variable g measures industry expectations of the future course of prices.  As might be 
expected, annual g is highly variable and often negative.  In Section IV we estimate the 
standard error of g. 
 
But although Equation (3) contains some of the same variables as the Hotelling 
Paradigm, the reserve measure R may be different. In the Hotelling framework, R is 
exogenous, fixed by nature. In our usage, R measures only oil or gas created by 
exploration/development investment. The oil or gas is to be produced from defined 
facilities along some time gradient. R may be increased by later investment. Like many 
assets, R may be exploited or sold. These uses are substitutes, therefore so are their 
prices. We attempt to capture the average sales value of a reserve, which equals its 
average use value.5 
 
 National aggregate “proved reserves” in the USA or Western Europe are simply 
the national aggregate of R.  (In most other areas, “proved reserves” are often not even 
updated, and are no longer useful.  Canada has begun to count huge amounts of 
unhatched chickens – undeveloped reserves - from oil sands.)  Such estimates imply little 
                                                 
4 Expression (3) assumes a + i > g, as normally would hold. 
5 We acknowledge that sales values may include an element of option value. 
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about the amount of hydrocarbons to be ultimately produced within a given area.  That 
amount cannot be known today, because it depends on future science and technology.  
“Probable reserves” are the amounts of oil and gas that would be economic to produce 
given current science and current technology, marked up by some estimate related to 
further development.  “Probable reserves” may be a very useful ordinal measure, 
permitting one to rank areas where new oil is more likely or less likely to be found 
[Weeks 1969]. But adding “probable” reserves to current proved reserves adds apples to 
oranges.  The total does not approximate ultimate production. Such a total minus 
consumption is not an estimate but more confusion. Yet every forecast of exhaustion 
assumes a total remaining reserve. 
  
 The crude oil and natural gas industries have diverged.  US crude oil production 
decreased from 9.2 mmbd in 1973 to 5.9 million in 1999, since when it has been 
approximately constant.  Its supply is becoming scarcer in the strict economic sense of 
the US supply curve moving leftward. (Bradley & Watkins [1994], Adelman [1998], 
Watkins & Streifel [1998])  This has not been true (perhaps we should say “not yet true”) 
of natural gas, where North American production and proved reserves grew through the 
year 2001.  For oil, value changes reflect worldwide oil price expectations.  For gas, 
value changes reflect North America gas price expectations.6 Hence, these are two 
different markets (also see below, section IV-2, “Oil and Gas Price Expectations”). 
 
 The results of estimating reserve prices for 1982-2002 described in Section III of 
this paper differ from the earlier Herold series in that they are derived from observed 
sales of reserve-bearing properties.  As with the other series, the current net field price is 
on average about 4 times the in-ground value for oil and 3 times for gas, and each year’s 
net field price lies above the regression value plus at least one standard error.  This data 
set cannot be reconciled with the Hotelling Paradigm any more than could the 
engineering studies or the 1949-1986 set of oil in-ground values. We discuss this further 
in Section IV. 
 
 To sum up: the Hotelling theory correctly draws out the implications of its basic 
assumption: that there exists “an exhaustible natural resource … a fixed stock of oil to 
divide between two [or more] periods.” [Stiglitz 1976].  Since the implications are false, 
and the theory is sound, the premise must also be false.  
 
                                                 
6 But the emerging international market for LNG, with participation by North America suggests that over 
time the market for natural gas will become a world market. 
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 Having found little or no empirical support for the notion of a fixed stock and of 
the constant increase in reserve values, we can now face a lesser but real problem: what if 
anything is known about oil and gas becoming more or less scarce over time? 
 
4. Values As Marginal Finding-Development Costs  
  
 In a competitive industry, the value of reserves of oil or natural gas in-ground is 
equal to the cost of the marginal reserve added (marginal cost). Even if oil or gas are 
produced and sold under imperfectly competitive conditions, the addition of reserves is 
competitive provided there is no public or private restriction upon the associated 
investment.    
 
 Restriction was strong in the creation of natural gas reserves before the 1980s, and 
it was not negligible for crude oil in 1946-1980.  The prorationing system in Texas 
favored investment in high-cost “marginal” wells.  Moreover, Federal maximum price-
fixing in 1974-1980 favored investment in high-cost “new” oil.  These imperfections in 
the 1948-1986 oil series should (we think) be considered as part of the larger scheme of 
fluctuations.  Some will (not without reason) reject their use.  But de-regulation of the oil 
and natural gas industries in the 1980s abolished constraints, and there are no such 
uncertainties for 1982-2002. 
 
 However, there are two principal difficulties in using these data sets to represent 
long-run cost trends.  First, we need to deflate the observations.  This would be necessary 
at any time, but particularly during a period of strong price inflation, as were much of the 
earlier series and some of 1982-2002.  Second, these marginal costs are investment costs. 
We should not deflate them by a general index of goods bought to satisfy human needs; 
the appropriate index would be one specific to the particular investment vehicles 
(equipment and plant) employed. They are investments expected to enjoy a return 
comparable to investment in other industries, with similar degrees of risk.  Indeed, the 
Hotelling Paradigm is that they should increase at the rate of return on other investments 
in oil and gas reserves.  But if we drop the Paradigm assumption of a fixed hydrocarbon 
stock, the value of a reserve may vary up or down in any year.  In Section IV we test for 
successive one-period returns from holding oil or gas reserves and find, again, no support 
for Hotelling patterns.  
  
 The value of oil reserves is set by competition in the worldwide market for 
hydrocarbon discovery and development.  Part of this market is noncompetitive: in the 
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OPEC countries, investment and output are limited in order to support the price level. 
Resulting values bear little relation to marginal cost. But the non-OPEC world, which 
today comprises about 70 percent of world production, and more of worldwide 
investment, is competitive.  It gives a competitive response to an exogenous fact: the 
fixed price at the field. 
 
 In non-OPEC areas, discovery and development comprise a sensing/selection 
network, constantly seeking the cheapest reserves of oil, gas, or both.  As we have shown, 
the series of in-ground values also measures the marginal cost of increasing these 
reserves.  But observed marginal costs are the outcome of a cost function and the position 
of a demand function.  A constant level of observed North American marginal costs may 
be – and we think is – associated with the supply functions moving leftward – i.e., 
unfavorably.  Therefore more of domestic consumption is supplied by imports.  The 
results presented here are compatible with findings that rising marginal costs have made 
non-economic more North American deposits. (Bradley & Watkins [1994], Adelman 
[1998], Watkins & Streifel [1998])  It is the same case as British coal.  But the results are 
not compatible with statements that worldwide discoveries have been declining since the 
early 1960s.  This implies that both discovery and development costs have been 
increasing.  If discovery is yielding smaller, deeper, and farther deposits, they cost more 
to develop.  The IEA discussion is one of the more sober ones. (International Energy 
Agency, World Energy Outlook 1998, especially pp. 90-100).  Yet it is at the least an 
anomaly that allegedly dwindling discoveries over 40 years have left little trace in in-
ground values. 
 
 In actual fact:  there are no precise statistics of oil or gas discoveries.  Indeed, it 
is difficult even to state how to construct one.  Merely counting the number of newly 
listed fields or pools is trivial.  The contents of these new fields and pools will not be 
known until they are fully developed, which may be even as much as a hundred years 
away.  One can at any time estimate those contents, given only the technology of the 
moment.  It is useful comparing the guesses of one year with those of another.  In the 
USA, “discoveries” are a sub-category of development: those reserves developed during 
the year in newly found fields.  In the next year and in all later years, they will be “old” 
fields.  In an area like the Persian Gulf the great bulk of new reserves are created in old 
fields.  Far from indicating scarcity, the development of old fields has been sufficiently 
cheap as to deter seeking new fields.   
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II. Review of Transaction Data  
 
 We want to assemble information on the amounts paid for reserves of oil and 
natural gas to enable us to estimate reserve prices.  For a period of twenty or more years, 
the Scotia Group has been collecting data on reserve related transactions in the US and 
has sought to identify the value of purchases and sales of reserve assets.7  In what follows 
below, first we comment on the nature of the Scotia Group transaction data we employ.  
Second, we examine the Scotia data series, assembled on an annual basis. 
 
1. The Scotia Group Database8 
 
The information in the database is collected entirely from sources in the public 
domain.  The version of the database used has nearly 6000 transactions of which 63 
percent have transaction price data and 28 percent have both price and reserve 
information – the transactions on which we focus. 
 
Some transactions involve non-reserve assets such as pipelines, plants and 
equipment, goodwill, strategic elements and the like.  “Strategic” acquisitions, especially, 
may involve significant goodwill.  Where values of tangible ancillary assets are known, 
they have been subtracted from the purchase price; where the purchaser assumes debt, its 
value is added.  The resulting transaction values are referred to as ‘adjusted prices’ in the 
Scotia database. 
 
Reserves are reported in millions of barrels of oil (mmbbls) and billions of cubic 
feet of gas (bcf).  Producing rates, where available, are reported in thousands of barrels 
per day of oil (mb/d) and millions of cubic feet of gas per day (mmcf/d).  Reserves are 
treated as proven, developed and on production – unless there were additional 
information (see below).  Buyers and sellers may differ in their reserve assessments, even 
for proved reserves.  However, no such discrepancies were disclosed in the transactions 
employed.  There is no information on expected reserve appreciation that may underlie a 
given transaction.   
 
International and Canadian transactions are excluded.  So are transactions 
reported in terms of equivalent volumes of oil and gas, but with conversion factors 
                                                 
7 The Scotia Group was founded in 1981 and specializes in the technical and economic analysis of projects, 
properties and companies. 
8 See Scotia Group Documentation “Description and Discussion of the Database” Mimeo, Jan 1995. 
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unknown, individual volumes cannot be derived.  Data for some transactions are 
incomplete, and we exclude them.  The database generally excludes stock transactions 
because reserves cannot be identified.9   
  
Our working assumption, that the reserves changing hands are proved, developed, 
and producing, is not always true.  A transaction could involve non-producing reserves.  
If so, it may well include reserves normally classified as proved undeveloped or 
prospective reserves (i.e. probable or possible) even though we have attempted to exclude 
transactions involving undeveloped reserves from our database. 
 
Suppose parties have included in “reserves” some undeveloped oil or gas 
deposits.  (Some companies will try to impress the financial community by reporting 
undeveloped reserves as developed.  Some companies overpaying for undeveloped 
reserves will not be well regarded.  We cannot say which event is more probable.)  Then 
the observation we calculate, dollars per barrel-in-ground, will be too low as an estimate 
of the market value of a barrel of developed reserves.  Support now the contrary, that the 
sellers have lumped undeveloped oil with any undeveloped acreage and other producing 
assets.  Then the total value is too high, because it includes more than the value of 
developed reserves.  We cannot identify either type of error, understatement and 
overstatement, and hence must consider both of them as contributing to chance 
variations, along with other sources of error.  This would increase the error of estimate, 
and might make the intercept significant. 
 
2. Description of Transaction Data 
 
Information on those transactions that list reserve data is brought together in the 
‘A’ series of Tables compiled in Appendix A, to which we refer the reader for full details. 
 
 Annual data on the number of observations selected are shown in Table A-1, 
columns 2, 3 and 4.  The total number of transactions providing usable data is 1563, over 
the period 1982 to 2002 inclusive.10  The bulk (77 percent) was from 1990 onwards.  Of 
the overall total, 341 transactions identified only oil reserves as sold (22 percent); 416 
transactions only identified gas reserves (26 percent).  We call these ‘pure’ oil and ‘pure’ 
                                                 
9 Our earlier paper [Adelman and Watkins 1996] looked at various buyer and seller categories and at 
regional data. We do not pursue such breakdowns here. 
10 In Adelman and Watkins [1996] we showed data for 1979, 1980 and 1981.  However, the sparseness of 
the observations and the unreliability of the results for these years led us to drop them this time around. 
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gas transactions, respectively.  All the other 806 transactions (52 percent) involved the 




 Calculation of unit values of reserves (the in situ price per barrel or per mcf) for 
the ‘pure’ transactions by simply dividing the transaction value by the relevant oil or gas 
reserve showed that certain values were unusually high or low in relation to apparent 
market values.  It is probable that such transactions reflected special terms of sale such as 
“goodwill,” or lack of information on the nature of the property exchanged, or even 
erroneous data.  Inclusion of these transactions in the sample would distort the market 
conditions we are trying to discern. 
 
Accordingly we eliminated all ‘pure’ transactions where the calculated reserve 
price was more than two standard deviations from the mean value for the relevant year.  
We also excluded any ‘pure’ values that appeared unreasonably low in an absolute sense: 
below 10 cents per mcf or 55 cents per barrel of reserve.  Similarly, we excluded 
unreasonably ‘high’ values, values where the apparent unit reserve value exceeded $5 per 
mcf or $27.5 per barrel of reserve. 
 
The regression analysis embraces both ‘pure’ transactions and ‘mixed’ 
transactions – those including both oil and natural gas reserves.  Our criterion for 
elimination here was where the actual transaction value was more than two standard 
errors away from the fitted value obtained from the regression equation (see Section III), 
plus any ‘pure’ observation identified as an outlier in the stand-alone analysis of ‘pure’ 
transactions even if not so identified using the spread between its value and the fitted 
value from the regression.  We also excluded ‘high’ and ‘low’ unit value observations, 
irrespective of the two standard deviation criterion.11  In this context, mixed transactions 
were converted to gas equivalence using the 5.5 mcf/bbl conversion rule. 
 
Hence, the outliers in the regression analysis consist of all observations, ‘pure’ 
and ‘mixed’, defined as outliers using the fitted value criterion, plus any pure transaction 
defined as an outlier in the independent analysis of pure observations, irrespective of 
whether it is defined as an outlier in the regression analysis, plus any ‘low’ or ‘high’ 
                                                 
11 Most of these observations were identified as outliers under the two standard deviation test.  However, 
the lower two standard deviation boundary value could be negative, precluding identification as outliers 
what might be unreasonably low unit values.  Hence the need at least for a lower absolute value test. 
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valued observations not already identified as outliers under the standard error rule.  In 
almost all cases the ‘pure’ outliers in the ‘pure’ analysis were one and the same as ‘pure’ 
transaction outliers in the regression analysis.  A further comment on outliers, in the 
context of robust regression techniques, is made in Section III. 
 
The count of outliers is listed in Table A-1, columns 5, 6 and 7; they total 107 
transactions.  While the number of outliers is small – a mere seven percent of the total 
observation set – they are, as extreme values, influential.  Hence their exclusion does 
materially affect the sample.  The number of observations after exclusion of the outliers 
is shown in columns 8, 9 and 10, Table A-1. 
 
We found our outlier procedure useful as a sensing device, leading us to subject 
outlying observations to additional scrutiny.  In some instances this resulted in our 
eliminating an observation from the data set entirely, for example where the transaction 
was revealed as including overseas properties, did not have sufficient segregation of 
assets acquired, expressed reserve quantities in ‘barrels equivalence’, or was a mega 
merger.  More generally, an observation identified as an outlier was only discarded from 
the data set if it were seen as invalid, not because it was simply so many standard 
deviations from a fitted value. 
 
b) Summary Statistics 
 
The summary statistics in Table A-2 for values of all transactions (including 
outliers) shows a considerable spread in annual mean values.  There is a pattern, 
however, with higher values congregating at the beginning and the end of the sample 
period, while consistently lower mean transaction values prevailed over the interval 
1989-1996, in part reflecting the larger number of observations in those years, which may 
better represent the skewness of the underlying population of reserves towards smaller 
volume (see below). 
 
 The distribution of transaction value observations for virtually all years is skewed 
to the left: smaller transaction values predominate.  The medians are appreciably less than 
the means.  Not surprisingly, Normality is strongly rejected for each year.12  On the other 
                                                 
12 The test used was Jarque-Bera. 
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hand, log Normality would not be rejected for any year.13  The coefficients of variation 
are quite erratic before 1988, but are much more stable thereafter, except for 1998. 
  
Table A-3 shows transaction value summary statistics after exclusion of outliers.  
Most of the outliers are large rather than small transactions.  The means are substantially 
reduced, but the distributions remain skewed. 
 
The next two tables (Tables A-4 and A-5) focus on the value of ‘pure’ 
transactions for both oil and gas, excluding outliers.  The pattern of results pretty well 
parallels that for the total number of observations. 
 
Tables A-6 and A-7 respectively deal with volumes of oil reserves and volumes of 
natural gas reserves, for all transactions.  The distributions are heavily skewed to 
observations with relatively small reserves.  This is in accord with the typical distribution 
of reserves in nature, suggesting that the sample of transactions has no apparent bias 
towards certain types of reserves, at least in terms of reserve size. 
 
 The final two tables in Appendix A concern transaction sizes in terms of reserve 
volumes of oil and gas aggregated on the basis of thermal content.  Oil reserves were 
converted to trillion cubic feet (TCF) thermal equivalence at a conversion factor of 1 
barrel equals 5.5 million BTUs.14  Table A-8 relates to all transactions, Table A-9 
excludes outliers.  As would be expected, the reserve distributions are all slanted to the 
left and Normality is strongly rejected, while log Normality is not in all years for oil, in 
all but one year for natural gas. 
 
We conclude that the statistical characteristics of the transaction data are in large 
measure stable across years.  The distributions are typically skewed towards smaller 
transactions.  Normality for the size distribution of transactions is rejected.  This suggests 
that since the underlying size distribution of oil and gas reservoirs is heavily skewed – 
with log normality not rejected in virtually all years – the transaction data broadly 
represent the occurrence of the reserves in nature. To this extent, these data do not seem 
to constitute a biased sample from the underlying population. 
 
                                                 
13Although log Normality is not rejected, it does not follow that it is the best skewed distribution to 
represent the data. For example, in terms of North Sea data, Smith and Ward [1981] found that the log 
normal was not the preferred data generating process. 
14 That is 1 barrel = 5.5 mcf, where gas is measured at 1,000 btu/cubic feet. 
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III. Regression Results 
 
In this section, we use the transaction data discussed in Section II to estimate the 
price of oil and gas reserves.  We report both on values obtained from linear regressions 
of all types of transactions (‘mixed’ and ‘pure’) and on values obtained from the simple 
division of ‘pure’ transaction values by relevant individual reserve volumes.  We also 
report on the results of some statistical tests and searches for relationships among 
possible transaction related variables.  These include reserve-to-production ratios, 
reserves status (on production or not) and levels of field prices, all of which may have a 
systematic influence on reserve values.  Finally, we illustrate how the estimates of 
reserve values can be used to measure company performance. 
 
 We estimate the unit reserve values for a given year from actual transactions – 
sales of oil and gas reserve properties – during that year.  As with share valuations, we 
impute the sales value to all existing units.  These values reflect all information, 
expectations, forecasts, hunches, and mistakes of buyers, sellers, operators and investors.  
Higher expected returns result in higher current reserve values in relation to current 
prices. 
 
 The basic statistical method is least squares regression.  Fortunately, there are 
enough transactions relating solely to oil reserves or solely to gas reserves (“pure oil” or 
“pure gas”) to provide a useful check on the regression results. 
 
The set of tables relating to the various linear regressions run to estimate the in 
situ values of oil and gas reserves are located in Appendix B.  Specifically, transaction 
values (in $millions) were regressed on the quantity of oil reserves (in millions of barrels) 
and on the quantity of natural gas reserves (in billions of cubic feet). 
 
Conventional cash flow analysis indicates that a transaction value for the sale of 
oil and gas reserves would consist of the sum of the net present values of the expected 
flows of oil and gas production yielded by the property.  This would suggest specifying 
value as a linear function of the respective reserves.15  There is a question of whether the 
equation specification should include cross-product term. Reservoir engineering provides 
little evidence of a systematic relation between oil and gas reserves underlying various 
                                                 
15 See Adelman and Watkins [1995, p. 666]. 
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properties.16  Our data are in agreement: the simple correlation coefficients among oil and 
gas reserve volumes for each year of our data set are typically low.  Moreover, there is a 
basic logical objection: the insertion of a cross-product term in the equation specification 
would make the estimated reserve price of oil conditional on a given volume of oil 
reserves, and vice versa.  This would thwart one of the main objectives of our 
investigation, namely to estimate as best we can an unambiguous price of oil and gas 
reserves.  For these reasons we rejected inclusion of a cross-product term in the equation 
specification. 
 
Hence our basic regression equation is: 
 
 V = b0 + b1Ro + b2Rg     (5) 
 
where: V = transaction value 
 Ro = volume of oil reserves  
 Rg = volume of natural gas reserves.  
 
The observation set used in the regressions is for all transactions, mixed and pure 
(those where only oil reserves or only gas reserves changed hands), with and without 
outliers (see Section II for discussion of outlier identification).17 
 
Theoretically, a constant term in these regressions would be zero.  No reserves 
sold, no value.  We ran the regressions both suppressing and including a constant term. 
The latter may well attract noise in the data, detect systematic biases and indicate non-
linearities.  Also, a significant positive constant might be interpreted as affected by option 
values, fixed transaction costs, consistent goodwill and the like.  However, we retain a 
preference for the no-constant specification.  And as will be seen, the constant term was 
insignificant in most cases.  The B-l series of tables reviewed immediately below include 
all the observations; the subsequent B-2 series of tables are for when outliers are 
excluded. 
 
                                                 
16 If it did, aggregation of oil and gas reserves would be simple – gas reserves would be a function of oil 
reserves and vice versa.  Either oil or gas reserves could be expressed as a common numeraire. 
17 We ran Box-Cox tests on functional form. The results were inconclusive – no convincing evidence 
emerged favoring the linear or log linear forms; a reciprocal relationship was strongly rejected. Our 
preference remained for a straightforward linear function, for economic reasons: we wanted to estimate unit 
prices. 
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The regressions with outliers excluded were run with corrections for 
heteroscedasticity.  This increased the standard errors of the coefficients in all but some 
of the earlier years.  Hence, many of the ‘t’ values fell, although still remaining highly 
significant. 
 
1. Results Before Exclusion of Outliers 
 
Table B-la shows the results for all 21 years with the constant term suppressed.  
Figures 1 and 2 plot the respective estimated reserve prices for oil and gas from 1982 to 
2002.  There is a great deal of variability in both the oil and gas reserve coefficients, 
representing the price of reserves in barrels or mcfs, respectively.  As we shall see later, 
this in part reflects the impact of outliers. 
 
The price of oil reserves shows no obvious pattern over time, and their 
fluctuations bear only scant relationship to shifts in field prices – as our later analysis 
shows.  In all years, the oil reserve coefficients are statistically significant, usually 
strongly so.   
 
The price of natural gas reserves represented by the regression coefficients also 
shows noticeable fluctuations year over year, fluctuations that again do not seem to be 
well correlated with changes in field prices (see later analysis).  Except for 1982, all the 
gas reserve coefficients are strongly significant. 
 
The results with inclusion of a constant term in the regression equation are shown 
in Table B-lb.  As would be expected, given that the constant in only three years (1988, 
1990, 1996) is significant, the results do not noticeably differ from those in the preceding 
Table. 
 
We have one check on the OLS regression estimates, namely by making a 
comparison with the ‘pure oil’ and ‘pure gas’ transaction values.18  The comparison for 
oil is made in Table B-lc, for the without intercept case.  To derive aggregate ‘pure’ 
values, the pure oil value observations are weighted volumetrically by the barrels in each 
transaction for a given year.  This is equivalent to summing the value of all pure 
transactions in a given year and dividing by the total volumes of oil or gas reserves sold, 
respectively.  The ratios of the oil reserve coefficients from the regressions to the ‘pure’ 
                                                 
18 Recall that the pure values are simply calculated by dividing the adjusted transaction value by the 
relevant volume of oil and gas reserves. 
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oil unit values differ markedly.  There is no consistency, except that the regression 
coefficients are lower than the ‘pure’ oil transactions in about half the sample.  Only in 
eight of the 21 years (1982, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1995, 1998, 2000) are the ratios 
within 10 percent of unity.19 
 
Comparisons for natural gas are shown in Table B-ld.  Again there is a large 
spread in the ratios of the regression values to the ‘pure’ values.  And yet again in only 
eight years – 1986, 1987, 1989, 1998 through 2002 – were the ratios within 10 percent of 
unity.  In contrast to oil, in the majority of years the regression coefficients exceeded the 
‘pure’ values. 
 
We conclude that the reserve values derived from the overall sample of 
transactions differ markedly in most years from the pure transaction sample.  However, in 
many years the number of ‘pure’ observations is small, contributing to variability 
between the two sets of reserve values. 
 
2. Results Excluding Outliers 
 
The next set of Tables in Appendix B looks at what happens when we exclude the 
outliers.  With the exception of 1985 and 2000, all the oil reserve coefficients are strongly 
significant (see Table B-2a, without constant).  Their amplitude of variation, while large, 
is less than when the outliers are included, as would be expected.  Much the same 
comment applies to the natural gas reserve coefficients, and no statistically insignificant 
values were recorded except for 1982.  Overall, the gas coefficients were more stable 
over time than those for oil. 
 
Results with an intercept are shown in Table B2-b, and show a similar pattern to 
those without it.  The constant term was significant in seven years (1983, 1984, 1985, 
1987, 1998, 2000, and 2001). 
 
The oil coefficients are plotted in Figure 1; those for gas are plotted in Figure 2.  
The plots are shown both with and without outliers, for the without intercept case. 
                                                 








































































































































































































































































The next Table (B-2c) focuses specifically on the impact of the constant on the 
regression coefficients.  For oil, only in three years (1982, 1998 and 2000) did the 
constant affect the regression coefficient by more than 10 percent.  For natural gas, only 
in 1982 and 1985 did the impact of the constant on reserve values exceed 10 percent. 
 
Table B-2d summarizes the impact of the exclusion of outliers on the reserve 
coefficients.  The ratio of the oil and gas regression coefficients with and without the 
outliers is calculated in the no constant case.  The impact of suppressing the outliers is 
considerable.  And this holds in the case of both oil and gas (also see Figures 1 and 2). 
 
Another approach to the issue of unusual observations is to apply robust 
regression techniques.20  As an example, ‘M Class’ estimators and ‘Least Trimmed 
Square’ estimators were calculated for our total set of observations for the year 1996.  
The results both confirmed the presence of unusual, influential observations and yielded 
estimated coefficients similar to ours after we excluded outliers.  While this analysis was 
only confined to one year, it suggests our ‘ad hoc’ rules for identifying outliers, described 
in Section II, are broadly congruent with those from a robust regression approach. 
 
Table B-2e compares the oil regression values (no constant) with the weighted 
pure oil case values (outliers excluded in both instances).  No clear pattern over time 
emerges.  This is quite similar to the earlier corresponding comparison before adjustment 
for outliers, although the number of years when the ratio is within 10 percent of unity is 
11, compared with eight years for all transactions (see Table B-1c).  Much the same 
conclusion applies to natural gas.  There was a considerably closer correspondence 
between the natural gas regression coefficient values and the ‘pure’ transaction values 
when the outliers were excluded.  The amplitude of variation, while noticeable, is less 
than when outliers are included in the sample (Table B-2f).  However, the number of 
years when the ratio is within 10 percent of unity remains at eight, the same as for the all 
transaction case (Table B-1d). 
 
3. Influence of Reserves Status 
 
Information was available for certain transactions that distinguished between 
those where reserves were on production and those where they were partly fallow.  In the 
latter case the properties may include prospective reserves normally classified as proved 
                                                 
20 We are grateful to Adonis Yatchew, University of Toronto, for this suggestion. 
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undeveloped, developed but not on production, probable or possible.  Other things equal, 
the in situ reserve values for reserves on production would be expected to exceed those 
for dormant reserves.  The theoretical margin between two identical properties, one on 
production, the other not developed, would be the development cost per unit of reserve, 
in the absence of any option value for the undeveloped reserve. 
 
 We tested the proposition of such differential values using our database of 1456 
mixed transactions, of which 981 observations related to properties not on production.21  
We caution that the reason why so many observations are in this category may be lack of 
production information: that is, the numbers may well be exaggerated. 
 
Specifically, we performed the following regression: 
 
 adjprice = [a1o + a2oDo]Ro + [a1g + a2gDg]Rg 
 
where: adjprice is the transaction price (after elimination of non reserve assets) 
the ‘o’ superscript denotes oil 
the ‘g’ superscript denotes gas 
a1 and a2 are the two coefficients for each reserve being tested 
  R denotes reserves sold 
D denotes a dummy variable for reserves on production. 
 
A priori, we expect both the a1 and a2 coefficients to be positive: reserves already 
producing would be expected to be worth more than those lying fallow. 
 
 The results are shown in Table C-2 (excluding outliers, no constant).  For oil, the 
first coefficient is positive as expected (except for 1985).  However, eleven of the second 
coefficients are negative, although only two of these are statistically significant.  Of the 
nine positive second coefficient values, four are significant.  For natural gas, all the first 
coefficients are positive, but 12 second coefficients are negative, of which five are 
statistically significant; only two of the positive coefficients are significant. 
 
 We treat these findings as broadly confirming that the sales value of oil reserves 
on production exceeds that where developed properties are either not producing, or are 
                                                 
21 This set includes observations where oil reserves are not on production, observations where gas reserves 
are not on production, and where both are dormant.  
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only partly on production.  The results for natural gas are murky. 
 
4. Influence of the R/P Ratio 
 
A factor which can be expected to influence reserve values is the rate at which 
reserves are produced.  Evidence for such an effect is likely confined to cross section 
data.  The shift in time series data for R/P ratios is too gradual to reveal impacts. 
 
US (remaining) reserve to production ratios are shown for oil and gas in Table C-
1, Appendix C.  Those for oil are quite stable; those for gas show some tendency to fall.  
 
The years during which we had an appreciable number of transactions containing 
R/P ratio information was confined to 1989, 1990 and 1992 to 2002, inclusive.  To test 
whether the R/P ratio affects the transaction price we performed the following regression: 
 
adjprice = [a1o + a2oHo]Ro + [a1g + a2gHg]Rg 
 
where: adjprice is the transaction price (after elimination of non reserve assets) 
the ‘o’ superscript denotes oil 
the ‘g’ superscript denotes gas 
a1 and a2 are the two coefficients for each reserve being tested 
  R denotes reserves sold 
H denotes the R/P ratio. 
 
The regression was run without a constant term. 
 
The greater the R/P ratio, the lower the rate of production.  The lower the rate of 
production, the lower the expected price of reserves, other things equal.  Hence the 
expected sign of the a2 coefficient attaching to the H variable (the R/P ratio) would be 
negative. 
 
In the case of oil the a2 coefficient is negative in 10 of the 13 years for which we 
had data; it was significant in four of the 10 cases.  In these years, the coefficient shows a 
great degree of variation, from -$1.64/bbl in 1989 to -$0.01/bbl in 1996.  In all three 
years in which the coefficient was positive, it was insignificant.  
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In the case of gas, a2 is negative in all years but one (and here it was 
insignificant).  And of the 12 years in which it is negative, it was significant in eight 
instances.  The absolute value of the incremental coefficient is less than 10 cents/mcf in 
all years except 2001. 
 
Our broad conclusion is that the transaction data do support the proposition that 
reserve prices would be inversely related to R/P ratios – and especially so for natural gas.  
 
In summary: the impact on reserve prices of the two types or transactions 
discussed above – of whether production is taking place and of the rate of production – 
has the following implication.  Unless the mix of transactions by these categories was 
reasonably constant, some of the variation in estimates of reserve prices among years will 
reflect compositional shifts in transaction types.  Hence caution has to be exercised in any 
interpretation of temporal trends in estimated reserve prices.  This seems to apply to a 
greater degree to natural gas than to oil reserve prices.22 
 
5. Relationship Between Reserve Regression Coefficients and Field Prices 
 
Expected field prices are an important determinant of reserve values, values that 
are influenced by current and previous field prices.  We made some simple tests to see 
whether the annual estimates of oil and gas reserve prices calculated from the regressions 
displayed any obvious relationship with current and lagged field prices.  We confined the 
tests to a simple linear regression of in-ground reserve prices, represented by our 
estimated oil and gas regression coefficients on field prices.  We note that since reserve 
prices are influenced by field price expectations it is by no means clear in theory that a 
zero current or lagged field price would indicate zero reserve prices.  Hence reserve 
prices could be positive even if field prices were zero.  There is, then, a preference for 
including a constant term in the equation specification.  The price series used are shown 
in Table C-4. 
 
The regression results for both oil and natural gas are shown in the upper panel of 
Table C-5 for the two sets of regressions where the reserve price was regressed on each 
of contemporary field prices, prices lagged one year, and prices lagged two years.  For all 
oil and gas equations the intercept is positive and significant.  Oil reserve prices are 
positively (and significantly) related to field prices, whether contemporary or lagged one 
                                                 
22 Our 1996 paper included some analysis of location (regions) reserve values.  Change in regional mixes of 
transactions is another source of variation. 
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or two years; the results suggest about 12 to 15 percent of any increase in field prices 
would be reflected in reserve prices.  But the degree of linear fit of the three oil equations 
is modest.  Gas reserve prices are also positively related to field prices, but all 
coefficients are statistically insignificant; moreover, the degree of linear fit is trivial.  
 
 We also subjected the time series of reserve and field prices to stationarity tests.  
Stationarity was not rejected for the series of reserve prices, but was rejected for the field 
price series.  Stationarity was not rejected for the residual terms of the equation results 
shown in the upper panel of Table C-5; nor was it rejected for the first differences of the 
respective series in field prices.  Thus the regressions are of I(0) variables on I(1) 
variables and result in I(0) residual terms.  The stationarity tests used a 5 percent level of 
significance throughout. 
 
The fact that field prices were found to be I(1) while reserve prices were I(0) 
encouraged regressing reserve prices on the first differences field prices, since both 
variables then would be I(0).  The results are shown in the lower panel of Table C-5. A fit 
is absent and coefficients for field price differences are insignificant, except for natural 
gas with a one period lag in field price first differences.23 The constant term roughly 
picks up the average values of the respective reserve prices, which is consistent with what 
one anticipate for expected reserve prices when field prices are constant (first differences 
are zero).  Overall, we find first differences in field prices do not have a material impact 
on reserve prices. 
 
6. Reserve Prices and Company Performance 
 
 Differences between the actual expenditures incurred by a company and those 
implicit using the in situ prices generated from industry wide data will indicate the extent 
to which a company over or under performed in relation to the market.  For example, 
suppose in year 2002 a company spent $500 million in acquiring 100 million barrels of 
oil and 100 billion cubic feet of natural gas.  In situ prices for that year are $5.74 per 
barrel and $0.88 per mcf (see Table B-2a).  At these prices, the estimated market value of 
the company’s transaction would be $574 million for the oil and $88 million for the gas, 
a total of $662 million. In this example the company seemingly would have outperformed 
the market to the tune of $162 million, or about 32 percent. 
                                                 
23 The sign of the coefficient is ambiguous.  For example, a positive price change might indicate a peak, 
depressing price expectations embedded in reserve values, resulting in a negative coefficient; or it might 
indicate further price increases on the way, resulting in a positive coefficient. 
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 The in situ prices are subject to uncertainty. Two standard deviations either side 
of the point estimates cited above yield a spread in values for oil of $4.58 to $6.80 per 
barrel, for gas $0.70 to $1.06 per mcf.24  At the lower price bounds the imputed value of 
the transaction would be $528 million, and the company would still have outperformed 
the market by $28 million, or some 5 percent. At the upper bound, the corresponding 


























                                                 
24 For standard errors of the coefficients, see Table B-2a. 
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IV. Reserve Prices, Hotelling Values, Price Expectations and Returns to Holding 
 
The Hotelling Valuation Principle states that the market value of a mineral in the 
ground at any point in time is equal to the prevailing net price per unit of production 
(Miller and Upton [1985]).  In the first part of this section we relate the estimates of 
reserve prices discussed in Section III to estimates of Hotelling Values.  We then 
examine what price expectations for oil and gas respectively may underlie our estimates 
of reserve prices.  Finally, we look at one period returns to holding reserves in the 
ground, in the Hotelling context.  
 
1. Reserve Prices and Hotelling Values - A Comparison 
 
Hotelling Values are the net price, which we write as: 
p-c 
where: p is present price of oil or gas as produced at the field (wellhead) 
c is unit extraction cost, plus non-cost outlays (non-income taxes, royalties). 
 
The assumption here is that title to the reserve in the transaction passes at the field 
gate, and that the field is already developed.  To the extent the transaction includes 
undeveloped reserves, the value of ‘c’ would need adjustment to add relevant 
development cost.  The Hotelling Value, accordingly, would be smaller.  However, 
results in our 1996 paper and in Section III of this paper indicate that transactions with 
some undeveloped reserves – reserves not on production – were not necessarily of lower 
value than those for just developed reserves, which obscures the picture. 
 
 We estimate national averages for the p-c values for the period 1982-2002.  The 
oil and gas field prices (p) used are those shown in Table C-l, Appendix C.  Operating 
costs (c) essentially consist of three components: a fixed element; one that varies with 
output; and royalties and taxes that are field price sensitive.  A suitable historical series of 
operating costs was not available.  Instead, reliance was placed on evidence that over a 
period of time when data were available on unit operating costs they approximated 35 
percent of gross field values (Adelman [1992, Table 2]).  The procedure we adopt of 
estimating operating costs as 35 percent of field prices treats them as ad valorem, 
whereas we know only a portion of them behave in this manner.  Nevertheless, it remains 
the best approximation at hand.  To the extent that operating costs are underestimated in a 
given year, estimated Hotelling Values would be inflated, and vice versa.  
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The annual Hotelling Values (HV) so estimated are shown in Tables D-1 through 
D-4 under the column headed “Net Field Price” (column 9).  These Tables relate 
respectively to the oil values from all transactions, ‘pure’ oil values, natural gas values 
from all transactions, and ‘pure’ natural gas values. 
 
a) Oil Results 
 
The HVs for oil are graphed in Figure 3 for 1982 to 2002, along with the reserve 
prices estimated from the regressions in Table B-2a (excluding outliers, no intercept), 
Appendix B.  Figure 3 shows that in all years the Hotelling Values comfortably and in 
most instances considerably exceed corresponding reserve prices. How significant is the 
spread between them? 
 
The standard errors of the reserve prices are given by the regression results and 
reproduced in column 5 of Table D-1.  This enables us to calculate by how many 
standard deviations the HVs are away from the reserve prices.  The results are shown in 
Column 11.  If we assume the estimated reserve price is Normally distributed within each 
year, as the Central Limit theorem would suggest, then 1.96 standard deviations would 
bracket 95 percent of them.  It follows that the results in column 11 decisively reject the 
null hypothesis that the recorded differences between the HVs and reserve prices are not 
statistically significant.  In only one year (1985) is the HV spread below 1.96. 
 
The same analysis as undertaken for the oil values from the regression equation is 
pursued for the ‘pure’ oil reserve prices and is shown in Table D-2.  In all years bar 1986 
(the year of the OPEC price crash) the HVs exceed the reserve prices.  And the null 
hypothesis that the differences are not statistically significant is rejected in all years 
except 1986, 1988 and 1994. 
 
b) Natural Gas Results 
 
The HVs for natural gas national averages are listed in Table D-3, Appendix D, in 
relation to reserve prices and displayed in Figure 4.  In all years except two (1987, 1989) 








































































































































































































































































With the exception of one year (1989) the ‘pure’ gas results (see Table D-4) show 
the HVs as exceeding the reserve values but the margins are statistically insignificant in 
ten years.  This result mainly reflects the higher standard errors for ‘pure’ gas 
transactions compared with the regression coefficients. 
 
2. Oil and Gas Price Expectations 
 
Given information on field prices, production to reserve ratios and the discount 
rate it is possible to estimate the implicit growth rate in field prices that would be 
consistent with a given reserve price (Adelman and Watkins [1995, p.669]).  Predicated 
on certain simplifying assumptions, the general expression for the growth rate in prices 
implicit in the reserve prices is given by: 
 
 g = i + a{1- [(p-c)/V]}     (6) 
 
where g = annual growth rate in prices 
i = discount rate 
a = production / reserve ratio 
p = field price 
c = extraction cost 
V = reserve price. 
 
For oil we need data on ao, po, co, Vo; and for gas, ag, pg, cg, Vg.  In the case of 
both ao and ag (the production to reserves ratio), we make a refinement to correct for 
shorter than infinite reservoir life, and write ‘a’ in general terms as: 
 
 a = (P/R) - (P/R)2 
 
where P/R = production to reserve ratio.25 
 
The values for field prices, p, are taken from the earlier tables (Table C-4); the 
P/R ratios are of course the inverse of the R/P ratios in Table C-1.  The industry discount 
rate adopted was a nominal rate of twice the long-term bond rate (LTBR), as an 
approximation to a suitable rate of return on capital.  This accommodates an assumed risk 
                                                 
25 When production life is infinite, a = P/R; see Section I. 
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premium equivalent to the LTBR.  The LTBR itself has a range from about 13.0 percent 
in 1982 to 4.6 percent in 2002.26  
 
The estimated implicit growth rates of field prices embedded in estimates of the 
value of reserves, V, are listed in column 8 in Tables D-l through D-4 for reserve prices 
derived from the regression without an intercept, after exclusion of outliers.  The results 
are illustrated in Figure 5a (oil, all transactions), Figure 5b (natural gas, all transactions) 
and Figure 6 (just the ‘pure’ transactions). 
 
Striking differences are revealed between oil and gas price expectations.  Those 
for oil mirror perceived conditions in the world oil market.  We suggest that the 
expectation of declining prices for the four years 1982-1985 reflect the weakening market 
after the price peak of 1981.  Expectations of rising prices, 1986 to 1989, reflect 
anticipated recovery from the price nadir of 1986.  Resumption of expected declines in 
prices, 1990 to 1997, express concern about OPEC discipline, concerns that seemed to 
end in 1998 and 1999.  Anticipated declines in 2000, 2001 and 2002 reflect a supposition 
of continuing weakness on the OPEC front, in relation to prevailing prices.  These trends 
in expectations also hold in much the same way for the ‘pure’ oil reserve values (see 
Table D-2, column 8). 
 
In contrast to oil, price expectations for natural gas are persistently positive, with 
the main exception of year 2000 (year 2002 is also negative, but the estimated value is a 
trivial 1 percent).  The anticipated sharp decline in gas prices for year 2000 probably 
reflects the peak price recorded at that time.  The ‘pure’ gas results show much the same 
pattern as for all transactions (see Table D-4). 
 
This pattern of variation between oil and gas price expectations is consistent with 
our knowledge of industry assessments and forecasts. 
  
                                                 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































                                                                                          
3. Confidence Limits for Price Expectations 
 
 What sort of confidence interval might bracket these estimates of implicit growth 
rates (g)?  Sensitivities could be established by using different values for the exogenous 
variables i, a, p and c.  However, we prefer to focus on the statistical variability in V, the 
reserve price, since we do have an estimate of its variance from the regression analysis.  
If we assume V does not co-vary with the exogenous variables, upper and lower bounds 
for g can be calculated numerically as a function of the variance of V. 
 
 In the 1996 paper, we took the two standard error spread either side of V and 
found the corresponding values of g from our formula, conditional on assumed values for 
i, a, p, and c.  We assumed this spread represented the 95 percent confidence interval – 
(see Adelman and Watkins [1996, p28]), which is reasonable if we interpret g as a mean 
value, with an associated Normal distribution. 
 
 An alternative approach is a Monte Carlo simulation.  But there are two problems 
here.  First, we would have to assume all the variables were independent, a questionable 
assumption – for example consider V and i.  Second, we have little information on what 
kind of distributions might reasonably characterize the relevant variables. 
 
 Another approach, one implicit in what we did in 1996, is to argue that variability 
in p,c,i and a is already embraced by the variability of V, since V essentially is the 
present value of the expected stream of net revenues from production of the reserve over 
time.  That is, the variability in the components of V contributes to the variability in V 
itself.  The implication is that we can simply look at the variability in V, and treat the 
other variables on the formula as constant.  Hence we could write g as: 
 
g = b - d/V       (7) 
 
where b =  i + a  
d = a(p – c). 
 
It is tempting to conclude that the variability in V embraces all the variability in 
its components.  However, this is not so.  It includes that part of the variability in p, c, a, 
or i correlated with V.  It doesn’t include all their inherent variability.  The restriction, 
however, is not damaging because our formula for g is after all derived from the 
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assumption that V is predicated on net present values incorporating p, c, a, and i.  
Nevertheless, it remains a conditional variance. 
 
 As already mentioned, the central limit theorem (CLT) suggests V is normally 
distributed.  Thus there is no limit on the tails of the distribution of V: some of the 
probability distribution of V will be negative.  However, V is essentially positive.  
Moreover, we have the inverse of the Normal distribution and values of V that are zero 
would be inadmissible, since they would yield values for g of infinity.  In short, we have 
a restricted domain issue.  Also note that quite apart from the sign of V issue, the spread 
of g values predicted on the confidence limits of V will not be symmetric. 
 
 An approach that offers some relief is to employ the ‘delta’ method.27  Here, if we 
designate the number of observations on which V for a given year is based as n, then it 
can be shown that, in relation to equation (7), the expression √n(b + d/V – (b + d/V)) is 
approximately distributed Normally with mean zero and standard error of (d/V2)σV where 
V is the estimated value of V and σV is its standard error. 
 
 Using this approach we multiply the standard error of V given by column 5 of our 
‘D’ tables by the product of ‘d’ divided by V2 to estimate the standard error (se) of g.  
The approximate 95 percent confidence interval would be given by the estimated value of 
g plus and minus two times its standard error calculated as above.  If we interpret this as 
an approximation to the confidence interval for the mean of g, then again the CLT 
suggests a (symmetric) Normal distribution. 
 
We use both approaches below: our 1996 method predicated on the standard 
errors of V, and the ‘delta’ method.  Both approximations make a statement about the 
probability of the mean of g, not about the probability distribution of expected prices.  
That distribution may not be symmetric at all. 
 
Upper and lower bounds for the implicit growth rates resulting from inserting in 
equation (6) values of plus and minus two standard errors from the estimated V and those 
resulting from the delta method are shown in Tables D-5 and D-6 respectively for oil and 
natural gas.28  The intervals are also shown in Figures 5a and 5b (for all transactions).   
 
                                                 
27 We are indebted to Adonis Yatchew, University of Toronto, for this suggestion; also see W.Greene 
Econometric Analysis, Third Edition, 1997, p124. 
28 In the variance of V method, a floor boundary value for V was imposed of 55 cents per barrel and 10 
cents per mcf. 
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a) Variance of V Method 
 
As mentioned earlier, the implicit confidence intervals for g are not symmetric.  
Indeed the degree of asymmetry is noticeable: the upper confidence interval being much 
tighter than the lower level, with the spread from the mean usually in single digits, in 
terms of percentage points.  And there is considerable variability among years. 
 
In marked contrast to oil, the confidence intervals for natural gas are generally 
tight, at 1 to 2 percentage points, and with quite modest variability among years.  This 
result reinforces our conclusion that price expectation behavior between oil and gas is 
quite different. 
 
b) Delta Method 
 
The spreads between the lower and upper limits are tighter than for the other 
method, and are symmetric.  For oil, the four standard error spreads (difference between 
lower and upper bounds) vary between close to zero and a peak of 79 percentage points, 
but in most years the spread is less than 20 percentage points.  The results for natural gas 
confirm the finding under the variance method of much tighter and consistent confidence 
intervals than for oil; in the great majority of years (16 out of 21), the four standard 
deviation spread is in the single digit range (percentage points). 
 
It is also possible that the estimates of implicit growth rates in prices include 
expected cost reductions.  But such technological and other improvements are more 
manifest at the exploration and development stage than at the production stage. 
 
Expression (6) is derived on the assumption that the reserve price is a 
straightforward function of future net cash flows.  Insofar as V includes an option value, 
the estimates of g, the implicit growth rate, are overstated. We are unable to measure the 
extent of any such bias.  As long as it applies equally to oil and gas reserve values our 
finding of noticeable differences between oil and gas price expectations remains.  We 
also note that option values are more important for undeveloped than for developed 






4. Mineral Holding Values  
 
 A corollary of the Hotelling Principle is that in-ground prices increase, one period 
over another, at the industry’s discount rate.  In Table D-7 we compare each year’s value 
of a unit in-ground with the previous year’s.  The reserve prices in columns 3 and 6 are 
the regression values in Tables D-1 and D-3.  The percentage increase or decrease in 
columns 4 and 7 measures the return to holding the reserve in the ground an additional 
year, rather than selling it at the year’s price.29  We subtract from that return the one-year 
risk-free discount rate, approximated by the one-year US Treasury bill rate, a rate which 
also reflects expected inflation.  The apparent achieved rate premia for oil (column 5) and 
for gas (column 8) are therefore free of any distortion caused by the time value of money 
and by expected inflation, and are plotted in Figure 7. 
 
For oil, in 12 out of the 20 years the achieved risk premia are negative, and indeed 
the mean achieved risk premium is a negative 1.7 percent, to boot.  However, there is also 
a wide dispersion around the mean: its standard error is 8 percentage points.  For natural 
gas, the risk premia are negative in 11 out of 20 years; however, the mean achieved risk 
premium is positive, at 5.3 percent, but with a high standard error of 9.5 percentage 
points.  These high standard errors of the mean achieved risk premia undermine any 
precision in statistical testing of hypotheses about them.  Instead, we make the simple 
comparisons below. 
 
Specifically, we compare the achieved risk premia with suitable minimum risk 
premium for petroleum finding and development activities which the reserve assets 
represent.  Earlier we approximated that risk premium as the LTBR.30  We term this the 
required risk premium, and list it in column 9, Table D-7.  It has a mean of 7.5 percent 
and a standard error of 0.5 percent.  In the case of oil, this mean compares with a mean 
achieved risk premium of -1.7 percent, and in only seven of the 20 years does the 
achieved premium exceed the required level.  For natural gas, parallel comparisons show 
a mean required premium of 7.5 percent and mean achieved levels of 5.3 percent; in just 
six of the 20 years do achieved premia exceed required premia.  Overall, these 
comparisons offer scant support for the HVP of in-ground values increasing one period 
over another at the industry’s discount rate. 
 
                                                 
29 For some results for oil, 1949-1986, see Adelman & Watkins [2003]. 














































































































































 An operator can substitute for developing a barrel of oil in the USA, a barrel of oil 
anywhere in the world, and vice versa.  (He cannot yet do this to develop natural gas.)  
Hence the data of Table D-7 permit a simulation, for the worldwide industry of 
exploration and development.  Each year we borrow at the US (one year) riskless rate, to 
buy a reserve barrel of oil, at the year’s price for oil in the ground.  We hold it for a year, 
and then sell at the next year’s price.  In the 20 trials, we expect irregular fluctuation; 
such that we would win a few, lose a few.  But if original oil in the ground worldwide 
were fixed, while its consumption continues and even grows, it must shrink over time.  
Correspondingly, the unit value of what remains in the ground must increase over time.  
Moreover, given the Hotelling corollary one would expect to earn enough to more than 
offset the year-to-year risks.  But the table shows that even before considering any risk, 
we lose close to 2 percent per year on average.  Any risk allowance will make the losses 
worse. 
 
 It is impossible to reconcile these data for the last 20 years with the belief in a 
fixed stock, nor in worldwide growing scarcity.  But we do not extrapolate and argue that 
because oil and gas have not become more meager in the past 20 years, supply must 




V. Value of US Oil and Gas Reserves 
 
 Our estimates of reserve prices discussed in Section III can be applied to value US 
crude oil reserves in recent years. The results are shown in the following Table 1.  The 
private values in the table should be multiplied by some 1.3 to approximate the social 
values (see below). 
 
Table 1 
Estimated Market Values of U.S. Oil and Natural Gas Reserves 
     
  1999 2000 2001 
End-of-year proved reserves    
 Crude oil (B barrels) 21.8 22 22.4 
 Natural gas (T cu ft) 167.4 177.4 183.5 
Market value per unit in situ    
 Crude oil ($/barrel) 3.59 3.55 4.21 
 Natural gas ($/mcf) 0.67 0.75 1.68 
Total market value ($ B)    
 Crude oil 78.2 78.1 94.3 
 Natural gas 112.8 132.7 307.7 
     
 Total 191.0 210.9 402.0 
     
     





   ($ B) ($ B) 
Value differences over previous year    
 Crude oil ----- -0.1 +16.2 
 Natural gas ----- +19.9 +175.0 
Weighted: 1999 prices    
 Crude oil ----- +0.7 +1.4 
 Natural gas ----- +6.7 +4.1 
Weighted: 2000 prices    
 Crude oil ----- +0.7 +1.4 
 Natural gas ----- +7.5 +4.6 
Weighted: 2001 prices    
 Crude oil ----- +0.8 +1.7 
 Natural gas ----- +16.8 +10.2 
     
 
 
 The total value in current dollars of developed oil and gas reserves is in the 
neighborhood of $400 [$520] billion (bracketed figures are social values).  Reserve 
quantities are from EIA publications; in situ values are from Table B-2a, Appendix B; 
weighted changes apply prices to reserve changes. 
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a) Excess of Social Over Private Values 
 
 There is a downward bias in our estimates.  They show the value of the reserve to 
the private owner, which mainly depends on the price expected to be received, net of 
expected expenses.  As mentioned earlier, the total of these expenses has long been quite 
constant around 0.35 of the gross field price.  Operating costs and royalties payable to 
land owners (public and private) are each about 0.15 of the price.  The 0.05 remainder is 
non-income taxes.  The royalties are not costs but transfer payments, a share of profits.  If 
we assume that half of the taxes are payment for services (police and fire protection, etc.), 
then about 0.175 of the gross field price is a transfer payment.  Hence the true social 
value of the reserve is probably about 1.27 times, i.e. (0.650+0.175)/0.650, the private 
value which we record. 
 
Our detailed calculations in Table 1 were aimed at calculating private values.  For 
purposes of national income accounting, we need to add 27 percent.  Note here we 
assume that the field price to cost ratios would hold equally for the in situ values of 
reserves. 
 
b) U.S. Government Holdings 
 
 We can also calculate the approximate value of the U.S. Government interest.  
Current oil and gas production on Federal offshore and onshore lands is roughly one-
fourth of the national totals (API, Basic Petroleum Data Book, vol. 23, no. 1, (February 
2003, tables IV-6 and XI-18). 
 
 The Federal Government receives as royalty 0.155 of the gross field price for 
production from its lands.  As noted above, the net to the owner has long been around 
0.65 of the field price.  Therefore the Federal interest per barrel is 0.155/0.65 = 0.2385 of 
the owners’ interest.  The value to the private owners of all oil and gas reserves was 
estimated as $402 billion at the end of 2001.  The U.S. Government had a share in one-
fourth of the reserves, in which portion its interest was worth 0.2385 of an owner’s 
interest.  Hence the total value of the Government’s oil and gas holdings was $402 x 0.25 
x 0.2385 = $24 billion.  However, this total makes no allowance for additional income in 
the form of bonus payments that the Government receives related to the properties from 
which production is extracted.  
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 Typically such properties attract bonuses through auctions when reserves are at an 
undeveloped or prospective stage.  And the amounts are sizeable.  During 1954-2001, 
bonus payments for permission to drill and explore in Federal waters totaled $61.4 
billion, compared with royalties of $67.8 billion.  But the ratio has fluctuated 
enormously.  In 1974, bonuses were 9.4 times royalties; in the latest year of available 
data, bonuses were only a tenth (0.10) of royalties (API, Basic Petroleum Data Book, vol. 
23, no. 1, Tables IV-6, XI-10).  These data do not suggest a convenient yardstick with 
which to adjust royalties to reflect additional income accruing to the US Government 
from bonus payments.  The implication, nevertheless, is that our estimated value of the 
US Government oil and gas holdings is appreciably underestimated. 
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VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
The results of this research paper are of interest in several ways. 
 
Reserve value embraces (net) price forecasts over the life of the reserve.  This is 
because it mainly reflects the net present value of all the production expected.  The 
appraisal is made by a team of engineers, geologists, bankers, economists, and investors.  
Their forecasts may be wrong, but the values at which reserves change hands merit 
serious attention. 
 
The difference between the value of existing reserves on production and the cost 
of finding and developing additional reserves is the governor of investment.  The value: 
cost comparison is a clue to whether oil or gas reserve additions are expected to increase 
or decrease.  
 
Oil and gas reserve values must be separately calculated.  Barrels of “oil 
equivalent” is an artifact.  Our research broadly confirms price and production data, and 
industry opinion: the oil and gas industries have been on a different track. 
 
Oil reserve values show no visible trend, 1982-2002, sometimes falling, 
sometimes rising, as they have recently – but to levels in 2002 no higher than those in the 
mid-1980s.  These movements reflect changing perceptions about the world oil market, 
not the US domestic market.  Natural gas reserve prices tended to fall gradually, from 
1984 to 1995, as deregulation became pervasive; since then there has been an erratic 
tendency to rise, indicating nascent tighter supply conditions. 
 
          The Hotelling Valuation Principle (HVP) that the developed reserve value is equal 
to the field price net of extraction costs cannot be reconciled with the reserve values we 
have estimated.  These show net prices averaging more than twice in-ground values, 
providing evidence more in favor of an old industry rule-of-thumb for reserve valuation, 
than for the HVP.  The Hotelling theory, applied to actual data, does not support the 
notion of a fixed quantity of oil and gas “out there”. Indeed, experience of the last 20 
years repudiates the idea of prescribed stock and associated inevitable scarcity. But there 
is no presumption of perpetual abundance. Oil and gas reserve values will register 
changing conditions. 
 
          The national income needs to be adjusted for reserve accumulation or 
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decumulation.  Our measures are based on the premise that reserves are created and 
consumed like all other capital assets.  There is little support for the theory that minerals 
are somehow unique, and that a unit produced today ineluctably means one less available 
in the future, except in a very elementary sense.  Future reserves will be determined by 
future technology and costs on the one side, and future demands on the other. 
 
Despite the defects in our estimates of income adjustments, they are more 
accurate than most other measures, which depend on arbitrary accounting rules to 
recapture original outlays over some assumed “service life.”  Our estimates are based on 
estimated market values.  The value of the (developed) mineral holdings of the U.S. 
Government is in the neighborhood of $24 billion. 
 
We believe our estimates of reserve values could be improved in several ways.  
First, as always it would be nice to have more reserve transaction observations, and better 
information to “clean out” non-reserve assets more precisely.  Second, there seems to be 
significant variation in reserve values according to reserve/production ratios, whether 
reserves are fallow, and so forth.  Normalization for these variations would improve the 
consistency of estimates over time.  Third, more data on operating costs would improve 
estimates of net prices, for comparison with in-ground values.  Fourth, we need 
information on the extent to which reserve values might incorporate option values, ‘good 
will’ and the like.  Fifth, estimation of unit development costs would enable us to infer 
finding costs by deduction of development costs from prices of developed reserves.  
 
Measuring the capital costs of newly created reserves is a problem we have barely 
touched. Depending on the state of knowledge, they could be rising, falling, or stable.  So 
far as we can discern, North American natural gas reserve prices and marginal costs have 
been relatively stable, at least until recently, while North American oil production has 
been gradually  undermined by its rising costs in the face of quite stable worldwide costs. 
 
Finally, we suggest that less attention be paid to the narrow stage of the Hotelling 
theatre.  More effort should be devoted to estimating aggregate supply functions to see 
whether they are moving outward with new plays and technology overcoming depletion 
effects, or inward as depletion effects dominate, or whether there is a saw-off.  Reserve 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Year All Types Pure Oil Pure Gas All Types Pure Oil Pure Gas All Types Pure Oil Pure Gas
All Years 1563 341 416 107 33 29 1456 308 387
1982 14 1 0 1 0 0 13 1 0
1983 22 2 1 1 0 0 21 2 1
1984 34 8 1 3 1 0 31 7 1
1985 35 5 4 1 0 0 34 5 4
1986 27 3 3 2 0 0 25 3 3
1987 51 12 5 2 2 0 49 10 5
1988 66 14 9 2 1 0 64 13 9
1989 104 19 18 5 1 0 99 18 18
1990 160 38 29 9 3 2 151 35 27
1991 101 20 18 7 1 0 94 19 18
1992 92 20 20 6 2 2 86 18 18
1993 122 28 28 7 1 2 115 27 26
1994 98 17 33 6 2 2 92 15 31
1995 124 35 33 10 5 2 114 30 31
1996 100 31 31 6 1 2 94 30 29
1997 72 16 27 5 3 1 67 13 26
1998 91 19 45 8 3 3 83 16 42
1999 62 13 26 5 1 2 57 12 24
2000 70 15 28 4 1 2 66 14 26
2001 61 11 21 9 2 5 52 9 16
2002 57 14 36 8 3 4 49 11 32
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2003
Outliers are defined as follows:
For pure transactions, a reserve price more than two standard deviations for that year.
For mixed transactions, a transaction value more than two standard deviations away from the fitted 
value.
Transactions of value less than $0.55 per barrel or $0.10 per mcf, or greater than $27.50 per barrel 
or $5 per mcf.
Table A-1: Number of Identified Transactions
All Inclusive Number of Outliers Excluding Outliers
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median
Coeff. Of 
Variation Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality # Obs.
All Years 101.5 287.4 14.9 2.74 4.89 30.87 --- 1563
1982 480.4 1569.7 38.0 3.27 3.32 12.04 Not Rejected 14
1983 103.7 224.3 14.4 2.16 2.37 7.13 Not Rejected 22
1984 979.0 2918.8 39.2 2.98 3.32 12.93 Not Rejected 34
1985 232.5 913.1 17.4 3.93 5.41 31.07 Not Rejected 35
1986 133.7 243.6 10.5 1.82 1.99 5.98 Not Rejected 27
1987 36.9 100.4 7.0 2.72 4.89 28.99 Not Rejected 51
1988 95.4 343.2 7.2 3.60 6.22 44.65 Not Rejected 66
1989 40.8 106.5 8.1 2.61 5.51 38.79 Not Rejected 104
1990 30.3 80.3 5.6 2.65 4.77 29.41 Not Rejected 160
1991 29.1 85.2 5.0 2.92 4.71 25.56 Not Rejected 101
1992 39.7 134.6 5.2 3.39 6.92 56.16 Not Rejected 92
1993 37.9 115.7 7.0 3.06 6.81 56.70 Not Rejected 122
1994 38.8 90.6 9.7 2.33 4.02 20.01 Not Rejected 98
1995 32.8 74.5 8.3 2.27 4.09 21.61 Not Rejected 124
1996 35.5 93.8 11.0 2.64 5.88 41.81 Not Rejected 100
1997 120.1 238.2 26.4 1.98 4.22 24.18 Not Rejected 72
1998 114.0 494.6 17.0 4.34 6.41 42.60 Not Rejected 91
1999 35.0 54.8 14.5 1.57 2.65 9.38 Not Rejected 62
2000 216.2 600.3 23.9 2.78 4.73 25.84 Not Rejected 70
2001 298.7 721.9 53.5 2.42 3.45 14.78 Not Rejected 61
2002 178.4 326.1 62.0 1.83 2.97 11.89 Not Rejected 57
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2003
The normality test used is Jarque-Bera; reject indicates that normality of the log distribution was rejected at 95% 
confidence level.
Table A-2: Summary Statistics for Transaction Values, All Transactions
[Millions of Nominal $, where relevant]
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median
Coeff. Of 
Variation Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality # Obs.
All Years 46.8 91.0 13.6 1.73 2.89 12.53 --- 1456
1982 61.2 63.2 32.0 1.03 0.76 1.90 Not Rejected 13
1983 74.5 182.2 13.8 2.45 3.20 12.48 Not Rejected 21
1984 320.2 1047.2 33.7 3.27 4.66 24.10 Not Rejected 31
1985 80.5 161.2 16.8 2.00 2.97 11.02 Not Rejected 34
1986 78.2 143.2 10.1 1.83 1.86 4.89 Not Rejected 25
1987 19.8 35.8 6.0 1.81 2.81 10.23 Not Rejected 49
1988 56.3 142.9 6.7 2.54 3.66 15.73 Not Rejected 64
1989 28.3 59.7 8.0 2.11 4.99 34.37 Not Rejected 99
1990 16.8 32.3 5.0 1.93 3.12 12.33 Not Rejected 151
1991 13.5 22.6 5.0 1.67 2.82 11.39 Not Rejected 94
1992 19.0 33.6 4.4 1.77 2.85 11.85 Not Rejected 86
1993 20.4 31.8 7.0 1.56 2.77 11.32 Not Rejected 115
1994 20.0 29.6 8.2 1.48 2.59 9.95 Not Rejected 92
1995 19.1 31.2 8.0 1.64 2.89 11.29 Not Rejected 114
1996 20.7 28.2 10.5 1.36 2.90 13.11 Not Rejected 94
1997 85.5 120.8 25.1 1.41 1.72 5.39 Not Rejected 67
1998 42.3 55.5 17.0 1.31 1.82 5.63 Not Rejected 83
1999 22.4 24.0 13.7 1.07 1.61 5.16 Not Rejected 57
2000 116.0 209.3 22.0 1.80 2.42 8.05 Not Rejected 66
2001 127.2 234.2 46.4 1.84 3.58 18.11 Not Rejected 52
2002 106.7 141.9 60.0 1.33 2.63 10.44 Not Rejected 49
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2003
The normality test used is Jarque-Bera; reject indicates that normality of the log distribution was rejected at 95% 
confidence level.
Table A-3: Summary Statistics for Transaction Values, Excluding Outliers
[Millions of Nominal $, where relevant]
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median
Coeff. Of 
Variation Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality # Obs.
1982 159.3 --- 159.3 --- --- --- --- 1
1983 14.0 17.6 14.0 1.26 0.00 1.00 Not Rejected 2
1984 263.4 633.7 18.7 2.41 2.04 5.16 Not Rejected 7
1985 8.3 10.4 4.2 1.25 1.34 3.01 Not Rejected 5
1986 32.9 43.9 15.0 1.33 0.62 1.50 Not Rejected 3
1987 4.2 6.6 1.7 1.56 2.43 7.34 Not Rejected 10
1988 79.6 189.3 2.9 2.38 2.48 7.80 Not Rejected 13
1989 21.3 47.5 3.5 2.23 3.15 12.06 Not Rejected 18
1990 10.1 27.6 1.3 2.72 4.72 25.64 Not Rejected 35
1991 14.6 24.1 2.9 1.65 1.70 4.19 Not Rejected 19
1992 12.3 28.4 2.4 2.30 2.95 10.56 Not Rejected 18
1993 13.8 15.1 7.8 1.09 1.55 4.89 Not Rejected 27
1994 19.7 29.7 6.2 1.51 2.00 6.07 Not Rejected 15
1995 18.4 39.4 2.6 2.14 2.95 10.61 Not Rejected 30
1996 19.5 33.5 8.7 1.72 3.44 15.44 Not Rejected 30
1997 93.2 122.0 18.7 1.31 1.08 2.46 Not Rejected 13
1998 48.9 51.4 36.3 1.05 1.46 4.78 Not Rejected 16
1999 15.1 21.4 7.5 1.42 1.79 4.71 Not Rejected 12
2000 57.5 106.6 11.6 1.85 2.32 7.51 Not Rejected 14
2001 21.3 35.0 4.0 1.64 1.62 4.19 Not Rejected 9
2002 157.0 213.3 58.0 1.36 1.98 5.94 Not Rejected 11
--- Insufficient data points.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2003
The normality test used is Jarque-Bera; reject indicates that normality of the log distribution was rejected at 95% 
confidence level.
Table A-4: Summary Statistics for Pure Oil Transaction Values, Excluding Outliers
[Millions of Nominal $, where relevant]
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median
Coeff. Of 
Variation Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality # Obs.
1982 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0
1983 7.5 --- 7.5 --- --- --- --- 1
1984 294.0 --- 294.0 --- --- --- --- 1
1985 72.0 54.9 64.8 0.76 0.43 1.97 Not Rejected 4
1986 137.6 231.6 4.3 1.68 0.71 1.50 Not Rejected 3
1987 9.2 7.9 7.3 0.86 1.10 2.77 Not Rejected 5
1988 83.1 237.0 3.2 2.85 2.47 7.12 Not Rejected 9
1989 25.0 40.8 5.7 1.63 2.22 6.74 Not Rejected 18
1990 18.1 31.1 4.3 1.72 2.25 7.01 Not Rejected 27
1991 26.5 38.5 9.4 1.45 1.57 3.97 Not Rejected 18
1992 9.5 14.5 3.1 1.52 2.02 6.46 Not Rejected 18
1993 28.2 41.1 6.6 1.38 2.08 7.12 Not Rejected 26
1994 20.3 34.1 7.4 1.68 2.82 11.00 Not Rejected 31
1995 24.9 31.2 11.4 1.25 1.94 5.80 Not Rejected 31
1996 24.5 29.8 12.1 1.22 2.20 7.34 Not Rejected 29
1997 58.6 95.3 22.6 1.55 2.26 6.80 Not Rejected 26
1998 42.5 49.8 19.8 1.17 1.71 5.55 Not Rejected 42
1999 26.6 26.7 18.2 1.35 1.34 4.25 Not Rejected 24
2000 146.8 227.6 44.3 1.55 2.11 6.55 Not Rejected 26
2001 130.7 220.9 36.4 1.69 1.87 5.17 Not Rejected 16
2002 92.5 123.0 56.8 1.33 2.18 7.21 Not Rejected 32
--- Insufficient data points.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2003
The normality test used is Jarque-Bera; reject indicates that normality of the log distribution was rejected at 95% 
confidence level.
Table A-5: Summary Statistics for Pure Natural Gas Transaction Values, Excluding Outliers
[Millions of Nominal $, where relevant]
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median
Coeff. Of 
Variation Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality # Obs.
All Years 9.8 38.0 0.4 3.40 5.49 38.76 --- 1563
1982 53.3 181.7 1.7 3.41 3.32 12.04 Not Rejected 14
1983 12.8 28.8 0.8 2.25 2.24 6.54 Not Rejected 22
1984 137.3 477.7 2.0 3.48 3.66 14.69 Rejected 34
1985 24.2 115.6 0.6 4.78 5.54 32.14 Not Rejected 35
1986 7.4 16.5 0.4 2.22 2.96 11.55 Not Rejected 27
1987 4.7 16.8 0.5 3.62 4.85 25.69 Not Rejected 51
1988 5.7 18.6 0.6 3.27 4.92 27.53 Not Rejected 66
1989 2.2 4.4 0.5 2.02 4.00 22.74 Not Rejected 104
1990 3.1 13.9 0.3 4.47 7.68 68.52 Not Rejected 160
1991 2.2 7.5 0.2 3.44 6.18 46.48 Not Rejected 101
1992 3.7 12.1 0.4 3.25 5.49 35.73 Not Rejected 92
1993 2.1 4.5 0.4 2.07 3.91 21.96 Not Rejected 122
1994 3.6 10.8 0.3 3.00 5.20 33.14 Not Rejected 98
1995 3.8 16.1 0.3 4.17 8.37 81.30 Not Rejected 124
1996 3.1 6.9 0.3 2.26 3.36 14.22 Not Rejected 100
1997 12.8 47.4 0.8 3.70 6.96 54.47 Not Rejected 72
1998 20.6 118.7 0.0 5.76 7.10 54.08 Not Rejected 91
1999 1.9 5.3 0.3 2.86 5.20 33.12 Not Rejected 62
2000 22.2 111.2 0.3 5.02 6.54 46.88 Not Rejected 70
2001 5.8 13.4 0.3 2.31 4.08 22.07 Not Rejected 61
2002 9.3 24.2 0.0 2.61 3.65 16.56 Not Rejected 57
Table A-6: Summary Statistics for Size of Oil Reserves, All Transactions
[Millions of Barrels, where relevant]
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2003
The normality test used is Jarque-Bera; reject indicates that normality of the log distribution was rejected at 95% 
confidence level.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median
Coeff. Of 
Variation Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality # Obs.
All Years 58.3 159.0 7.6 2.69 4.70 29.91 --- 1563
1982 178.3 564.7 9.9 3.17 3.27 11.82 Not Rejected 14
1983 59.9 181.0 3.6 3.02 3.78 16.34 Not Rejected 22
1984 414.1 1259.9 13.8 3.04 3.29 12.63 Not Rejected 34
1985 109.3 366.9 10.8 5.26 5.04 27.95 Not Rejected 35
1986 111.0 229.3 7.0 2.07 2.35 7.55 Not Rejected 27
1987 14.4 24.0 4.9 1.67 2.22 7.11 Not Rejected 51
1988 57.5 220.8 3.6 3.84 5.94 40.41 Not Rejected 66
1989 30.3 72.9 7.8 2.41 4.85 29.51 Not Rejected 104
1990 23.3 80.5 3.2 3.45 7.57 68.64 Not Rejected 160
1991 19.9 55.1 2.7 2.76 4.24 21.12 Not Rejected 101
1992 26.7 94.5 4.0 3.54 6.09 40.45 Not Rejected 92
1993 26.9 63.5 3.9 2.36 3.85 19.30 Not Rejected 122
1994 23.3 49.2 4.7 2.11 3.37 14.50 Not Rejected 98
1995 24.5 55.0 3.5 2.24 3.49 15.87 Not Rejected 124
1996 24.6 54.8 4.9 2.23 5.42 40.05 Rejected 100
1997 71.1 154.1 11.1 2.17 4.20 24.31 Not Rejected 72
1998 57.3 180.4 11.9 3.15 7.32 62.11 Rejected 91
1999 32.7 54.6 11.1 1.67 2.58 9.53 Not Rejected 62
2000 141.4 349.1 15.5 2.47 4.31 24.39 Not Rejected 70
2001 184.4 501.8 19.6 2.72 3.55 14.62 Not Rejected 61
2002 104.9 234.8 26.1 2.24 4.18 23.45 Not Rejected 57
Table A-7: Summary Statistics for Size of Natural Gas Reserves, All Transactions
[BCFs, where relevant]
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2003
The normality test used is Jarque-Bera; reject indicates that normality of the log distribution was rejected at 95% 
confidence level.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median
Coeff. Of 
Variation Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality # Obs.
All Years 112.5 323.7 17.8 2.55 4.74 29.27 --- 1563
1982 471.4 1562.3 27.0 3.31 3.31 12.01 Not Rejected 14
1983 130.5 305.8 11.5 2.34 2.72 9.63 Not Rejected 22
1984 1169.4 3746.3 28.6 3.20 3.50 14.06 Not Rejected 34
1985 242.3 998.4 18.0 4.12 5.41 31.05 Not Rejected 35
1986 151.8 291.3 11.0 1.92 2.26 7.27 Not Rejected 27
1987 39.9 95.0 9.4 2.38 4.12 20.55 Not Rejected 51
1988 88.8 288.2 10.7 3.25 5.71 38.84 Not Rejected 66
1989 42.4 83.2 13.3 1.96 4.24 24.40 Not Rejected 104
1990 40.4 119.9 8.1 2.97 5.55 37.44 Not Rejected 160
1991 31.9 88.8 5.7 2.78 5.01 29.96 Not Rejected 101
1992 47.1 144.4 8.1 3.07 6.23 45.98 Not Rejected 92
1993 38.7 79.1 11.6 2.04 3.94 19.44 Not Rejected 122
1994 43.2 89.3 13.3 2.07 4.45 27.45 Not Rejected 98
1995 45.7 103.8 10.6 2.27 5.33 39.92 Not Rejected 124
1996 41.4 78.4 17.5 1.89 5.57 41.67 Not Rejected 100
1997 141.6 315.5 31.4 2.23 4.80 27.92 Not Rejected 72
1998 170.6 747.5 24.0 4.38 6.43 43.14 Not Rejected 91
1999 42.9 58.2 21.1 1.36 2.20 7.30 Not Rejected 62
2000 263.3 778.9 31.5 2.96 4.93 27.34 Not Rejected 70
2001 216.2 507.0 42.8 2.34 3.33 13.30 Not Rejected 61
2002 155.9 250.0 66.0 1.60 3.27 16.21 Not Rejected 57
Table A-8: Summary Statistics for Transaction Size in Thermal Equivalence, All Transactions
[Trillion BTUs, where relevant]
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2003
Trillion BTUs: 1 Trillion BTUs = 1 Billion Cubic Feet at 1,000 BTUs per cubic foot (TBTUs)
Thermal equivalence factor of 5.5 million BTUs per barrel used.
The normality test used is Jarque-Bera; reject indicates that normality of the log distribution was rejected at 95% 
confidence level.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median
Coeff. Of 
Variation Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality # Obs.
All Years 52.5 99.1 16.5 1.66 2.87 12.58 --- 1456
1982 54.4 84.9 26.3 1.56 2.35 7.64 Not Rejected 13
1983 107.3 293.0 9.7 2.73 3.26 12.65 Not Rejected 21
1984 298.6 1060.8 28.5 3.55 4.87 25.87 Not Rejected 31
1985 76.1 177.1 17.3 2.33 4.11 20.45 Not Rejected 34
1986 81.9 148.9 10.8 1.82 1.87 4.94 Not Rejected 25
1987 22.5 34.6 8.1 1.54 2.29 7.13 Not Rejected 49
1988 57.9 139.8 9.8 2.41 3.66 15.84 Not Rejected 64
1989 33.8 60.0 12.5 1.78 4.32 27.64 Not Rejected 99
1990 20.9 39.7 7.3 1.89 3.65 18.07 Not Rejected 151
1991 16.2 25.6 5.5 1.58 2.72 10.99 Not Rejected 94
1992 24.6 39.3 7.4 1.59 2.55 9.60 Not Rejected 86
1993 25.8 36.3 11.0 1.41 2.36 8.75 Not Rejected 115
1994 28.3 42.1 12.6 1.49 2.47 8.72 Not Rejected 92
1995 28.6 47.8 10.2 1.67 2.94 11.96 Rejected 114
1996 30.9 36.3 17.1 1.17 1.92 6.41 Not Rejected 94
1997 94.4 121.5 30.0 1.29 1.70 5.90 Not Rejected 67
1998 61.0 87.5 23.8 1.43 2.61 11.00 Not Rejected 83
1999 31.0 34.1 21.0 1.10 1.89 6.48 Not Rejected 57
2000 137.5 243.7 23.9 1.77 2.71 10.57 Not Rejected 66
2001 99.7 165.9 44.8 1.66 4.00 22.68 Not Rejected 52
2002 110.9 144.8 59.9 1.31 2.04 6.52 Not Rejected 49
Table A-9: Summary Statistics for Transaction Size in Thermal Equivalence, Excluding Outliers
[Trillion BTUs, where relevant]
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2003
Trillion BTUs: 1 Trillion BTUs = 1 Billion Cubic Feet at 1,000 BTUs per cubic foot (TBTUs)
Thermal equivalence factor of 5.5 million BTUs per barrel used.



















Estimates of Reserve Prices 
 





($/mcf) t-stat Adjusted R 2
1982 14 7.59 11.03 0.35 1.58 0.99
1983 22 4.35 6.89 0.65 6.19 0.92
1984 34 3.71 31.85 1.02 23.36 0.99
1985 35 5.62 12.72 0.73 5.38 0.99
1986 27 2.12 3.26 0.97 21.16 0.97
1987 51 5.60 27.45 0.94 7.38 0.94
1988 66 6.07 22.13 1.20 51.47 0.99
1989 104 4.60 5.38 1.21 22.58 0.88
1990 160 4.18 21.33 0.48 14.49 0.84
1991 101 3.35 11.18 1.16 28.97 0.97
1992 92 6.34 28.07 0.75 25.82 0.98
1993 122 2.60 2.26 1.49 18.08 0.83
1994 98 5.59 13.28 0.74 8.36 0.81
1995 124 3.16 24.01 0.88 24.44 0.91
1996 100 6.98 14.71 0.95 15.92 0.90
1997 72 2.88 19.48 1.13 26.45 0.95
1998 91 3.53 100.81 0.76 34.03 0.99
1999 62 4.97 13.38 0.86 26.30 0.94
2000 70 4.21 30.18 0.75 17.90 0.96
2001 61 5.63 5.41 1.42 49.83 0.98
2002 57 6.49 10.92 1.21 20.15 0.90
Note: Transaction values are regressed on reserves of oil (in bbls) and natural gas (in mcf).
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2003
Table B-1a: Regression Results for All Transactions (No Constant)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9







1982 14 16.54 1.36 7.79 11.44 0.28 1.26 0.99
1983 22 10.91 0.67 4.22 6.33 0.64 6.05 0.91
1984 34 53.79 1.76 3.70 32.83 1.01 23.55 0.99
1985 35 21.18 1.86 5.96 12.85 0.61 4.21 0.99
1986 27 12.79 1.31 1.96 3.01 0.96 20.48 0.97
1987 51 -3.70 -0.87 5.64 26.77 1.00 6.79 0.94
1988 66 -9.20 -2.05 6.17 22.65 1.21 52.64 0.99
1989 104 -8.15 -1.85 5.17 5.75 1.24 22.59 0.87
1990 160 6.82 2.42 4.10 20.94 0.46 13.68 0.82
1991 101 -1.42 -0.82 3.37 11.19 1.16 28.45 0.96
1992 92 -4.29 -1.87 6.41 28.38 0.76 26.21 0.98
1993 122 -9.92 -1.96 3.23 2.73 1.52 18.35 0.82
1994 98 1.76 0.36 5.57 12.99 0.73 7.69 0.77
1995 124 -1.24 -0.51 3.18 23.48 0.89 22.53 0.90
1996 100 -11.88 -3.60 7.41 15.99 1.01 17.21 0.90
1997 72 3.25 0.41 2.87 18.88 1.13 24.04 0.94
1998 91 -2.37 -0.60 3.53 100.39 0.76 32.92 0.99
1999 62 -3.73 -1.46 5.17 13.15 0.89 23.31 0.91
2000 70 19.49 1.21 4.20 30.05 0.73 16.48 0.96
2001 61 6.45 0.37 5.47 4.83 1.41 46.70 0.97
2002 57 -11.82 -0.65 6.65 10.25 1.23 18.30 0.87
Table B-1b: Regression Results for All Transactions (Constant Included)
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2003
Note: Transaction values are regressed on reserves of oil (in bbls) and natural gas (in mcf).
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1 2 3 4 5 6
Year
Oil Coefficient     
($/bbl) # Obs
Weighted ppb from 
Pure Oil Transactions 
($/bbl) # Obs
Ratio of Estimated Oil 
Coefficient to Pure 
Transaction ppb
1982 7.59 14 7.11 1 1.07
1983 4.35 22 10.15 2 0.43
1984 3.71 34 6.93 8 0.53
1985 5.62 35 3.39 5 1.66
1986 2.12 27 8.86 3 0.24
1987 5.60 51 5.27 12 1.06
1988 6.07 66 6.44 14 0.94
1989 4.60 104 4.72 19 0.97
1990 4.18 160 4.50 38 0.93
1991 3.35 101 4.69 20 0.71
1992 6.34 92 4.75 20 1.34
1993 2.60 122 3.90 28 0.67
1994 5.59 98 7.70 17 0.73
1995 3.16 124 3.36 35 0.94
1996 6.98 100 5.36 31 1.30
1997 2.88 72 3.67 16 0.79
1998 3.53 91 3.40 19 1.04
1999 4.97 62 4.23 13 1.18
2000 4.21 70 4.07 15 1.04
2001 5.63 61 4.09 11 1.38
2002 6.49 57 5.52 14 1.18
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2003
Table B-1c: Comparisons of Oil Regression Values with Pure Oil Values for All Transactions (No 
Constant)
Note: The pure oil value observations are weighted volumetrically by the barrels in each transaction for a given 
year.  This is equivalent to summing the value of all pure transactions in a given year and dividing by the total 
volumes of oil reserves sold.
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.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Year Gas Coefficient ($/mcf) # Obs
Weighted ppmcf from 
Pure Gas Transactions  
($/mcf) # Obs
Ratio of Estimated Gas 
Coefficient to Pure 
Transaction ppmcf
1982 0.35 14 --- 0 ---
1983 0.65 22 1.05 1 0.62
1984 1.02 34 1.32 1 0.77
1985 0.73 35 1.34 4 0.55
1986 0.97 27 0.92 3 1.06
1987 0.94 51 0.89 5 1.05
1988 1.20 66 1.00 9 1.21
1989 1.21 104 1.18 18 1.03
1990 0.48 160 0.83 29 0.58
1991 1.16 101 0.90 18 1.28
1992 0.75 92 0.66 20 1.14
1993 1.49 122 0.73 28 2.04
1994 0.74 98 0.88 33 0.84
1995 0.88 124 0.75 33 1.18
1996 0.95 100 0.63 31 1.51
1997 1.13 72 0.93 27 1.22
1998 0.76 91 0.69 45 1.09
1999 0.86 62 0.85 26 1.02
2000 0.75 70 0.79 28 0.95
2001 1.42 61 1.43 21 0.99
2002 1.21 57 1.13 36 1.07
--- Insufficient data points.
Table B-1d: Comparisons of Natural Gas Regression Values with Pure Gas Values for All Transactions 
(No Constant)
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2003
Note: The pure gas value observations are weighted volumetrically by the cubic feet in each transaction for a 
given year.  This is equivalent to summing the value of all pure transactions in a given year and dividing by the 
total volumes of gas reserves sold.
65





($/mcf) t-stat Adjusted R 2
1982 13 7.13 9.18 0.36 1.26 0.76
1983 21 3.37 39.87 0.64 58.92 0.99
1984 31 6.95 177.40 0.86 173.62 0.90
1985 34 7.74 1.66 0.52 1.05 0.89
1986 25 5.10 6.66 0.96 20.63 0.99
1987 49 4.40 6.48 1.02 6.96 0.92
1988 64 5.69 22.87 0.99 32.97 0.98
1989 99 4.61 3.56 0.88 5.75 0.82
1990 151 3.64 9.07 0.90 15.61 0.94
1991 94 4.44 12.36 0.87 29.63 0.96
1992 86 4.14 6.95 0.82 11.43 0.89
1993 115 3.54 15.00 0.87 13.45 0.94
1994 92 2.90 4.32 0.77 19.58 0.91
1995 114 3.81 16.85 0.60 9.93 0.95
1996 94 3.67 3.98 0.69 17.76 0.86
1997 67 5.01 14.24 0.93 15.52 0.92
1998 83 2.85 3.15 0.62 6.33 0.81
1999 57 3.59 6.31 0.67 7.39 0.88
2000 66 3.55 1.96 0.75 6.17 0.74
2001 52 4.21 4.76 1.68 9.71 0.95
2002 49 5.74 10.20 0.88 9.69 0.95
Table B-2a: Regression Results for All Transactions (No Constant), Excluding Outliers
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2003
(with Robust Standard Errors, rather than OLS Standard Errors)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9







1982 13 26.09 1.99 5.71 4.57 0.28 1.32 0.65
1983 21 8.37 2.84 3.28 55.43 0.64 75.33 0.99
1984 31 16.29 2.80 6.88 157.34 0.86 227.36 0.90
1985 34 21.87 2.13 8.22 1.85 0.39 0.77 0.88
1986 25 0.33 0.11 5.09 6.91 0.96 18.74 0.98
1987 49 -2.29 -2.11 4.61 6.05 1.05 6.69 0.90
1988 64 -2.36 -1.22 5.72 23.13 0.99 35.14 0.98
1989 99 -1.13 -0.40 4.69 3.42 0.88 5.40 0.77
1990 151 -0.25 -0.46 3.65 8.84 0.90 14.80 0.92
1991 94 -0.30 -0.76 4.47 11.85 0.87 31.11 0.95
1992 86 -0.70 -0.53 4.17 6.77 0.83 11.36 0.86
1993 115 -0.20 -0.34 3.56 14.60 0.87 12.86 0.92
1994 92 1.49 1.69 2.82 4.12 0.75 18.20 0.87
1995 114 1.17 1.40 3.76 15.86 0.59 9.03 0.93
1996 94 -0.46 -0.33 3.71 3.65 0.69 16.38 0.78
1997 67 -2.70 -0.91 5.08 14.78 0.94 16.34 0.89
1998 83 9.76 2.68 2.54 2.86 0.57 5.65 0.72
1999 57 3.12 1.43 3.24 4.48 0.63 5.58 0.79
2000 66 21.40 2.16 3.17 1.81 0.71 5.85 0.67
2001 52 -10.25 -2.16 4.32 4.88 1.71 10.02 0.94
2002 49 3.82 0.63 5.67 9.18 0.86 8.11 0.92
Table B-2b: Regression Results for All Transactions (Constant Included), Excluding Outliers
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2003
(with Robust Standard Errors, rather than OLS Standard Errors)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Year
Constant 
Included No Constant Ratio
Constant 
Included No Constant Ratio # Obs
1982 5.71 7.13 0.80 0.28 0.36 0.79 13
1983 3.28 3.37 0.97 0.64 0.64 0.99 21
1984 6.88 6.95 0.99 0.86 0.86 1.00 31
1985 8.22 7.74 1.06 0.39 0.52 0.74 34
1986 5.09 5.10 1.00 0.96 0.96 1.00 25
1987 4.61 4.40 1.05 1.05 1.02 1.03 49
1988 5.72 5.69 1.01 0.99 0.99 1.01 64
1989 4.69 4.61 1.02 0.88 0.88 1.01 99
1990 3.65 3.64 1.00 0.90 0.90 1.00 151
1991 4.47 4.44 1.01 0.87 0.87 1.01 94
1992 4.17 4.14 1.01 0.83 0.82 1.01 86
1993 3.56 3.54 1.01 0.87 0.87 1.00 115
1994 2.82 2.90 0.97 0.75 0.77 0.98 92
1995 3.76 3.81 0.99 0.59 0.60 0.98 114
1996 3.71 3.67 1.01 0.69 0.69 1.01 94
1997 5.08 5.01 1.01 0.94 0.93 1.01 67
1998 2.54 2.85 0.89 0.57 0.62 0.92 83
1999 3.24 3.59 0.90 0.63 0.67 0.94 57
2000 3.17 3.55 0.89 0.71 0.75 0.95 66
2001 4.32 4.21 1.03 1.71 1.68 1.02 52
2002 5.67 5.74 0.99 0.86 0.88 0.98 49
Table B-2c: Effect of Including Constant on Regression Coeffcients
(Excluding Outliers)
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2003
Oil Coefficient ($/bbl) Gas Coefficient ($/mcf)
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Ratio         
5/6
1982 7.59 7.13 1.06 0.35 0.36 0.97
1983 4.35 3.37 1.29 0.65 0.64 1.01
1984 3.71 6.95 0.53 1.02 0.86 1.18
1985 5.62 7.74 0.73 0.73 0.52 1.40
1986 2.12 5.10 0.42 0.97 0.96 1.01
1987 5.60 4.40 1.27 0.94 1.02 0.91
1988 6.07 5.69 1.07 1.20 0.99 1.22
1989 4.60 4.61 1.00 1.21 0.88 1.38
1990 4.18 3.64 1.15 0.48 0.90 0.53
1991 3.35 4.44 0.76 1.16 0.87 1.33
1992 6.34 4.14 1.53 0.75 0.82 0.91
1993 2.60 3.54 0.73 1.49 0.87 1.71
1994 5.59 2.90 1.93 0.74 0.77 0.96
1995 3.16 3.81 0.83 0.88 0.60 1.46
1996 6.98 3.67 1.90 0.95 0.69 1.39
1997 2.88 5.01 0.58 1.13 0.93 1.22
1998 3.53 2.85 1.24 0.76 0.62 1.23
1999 4.97 3.59 1.39 0.86 0.67 1.28
2000 4.21 3.55 1.19 0.75 0.75 1.00
2001 5.63 4.21 1.34 1.42 1.68 0.84
2002 6.49 5.74 1.13 1.21 0.88 1.37
Table B-2d: Effect of Outliers on Reserve Coefficients
(No Constant)
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2003
Oil Coefficient ($/bbl) Gas Coefficient ($/mcf)
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1 2 3 4 5 6
Year
Oil Coefficient     
($/bbl) # Obs
Weighted ppb from 
Pure Oil Transactions 
($/bbl) # Obs
Ratio of Estimated Oil 
Coefficient to Pure 
Transaction ppb
1982 7.13 13 7.11 1 1.00
1983 3.37 21 10.15 2 0.33
1984 6.95 31 6.94 7 1.00
1985 7.74 34 3.39 5 2.28
1986 5.10 25 8.86 3 0.58
1987 4.40 49 3.56 10 1.24
1988 5.69 64 6.15 13 0.93
1989 4.61 99 4.72 18 0.98
1990 3.64 151 4.22 35 0.86
1991 4.44 94 4.66 19 0.95
1992 4.14 86 3.46 18 1.20
1993 3.54 115 3.70 27 0.96
1994 2.90 92 3.71 15 0.78
1995 3.81 114 3.63 30 1.05
1996 3.67 94 3.84 30 0.96
1997 5.01 67 4.81 13 1.04
1998 2.85 83 3.34 16 0.85
1999 3.59 57 4.22 12 0.85
2000 3.55 66 3.46 14 1.03
2001 4.21 52 3.88 9 1.09
2002 5.74 49 5.19 11 1.11
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2003
Table B-2e: Comparisons of Oil Regression Values (No Constant) with Pure Oil Values, Excluding 
Outliers
Note: The pure oil value observations are weighted volumetrically by the barrels in each transaction for a given 
year.  This is equivalent to summing the value of all pure transactions in a given year and dividing by the total 
volumes of oil reserves sold.
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1 2 3 4 5 6
Year Gas Coefficient ($/mcf) # Obs
Weighted ppmcf from 
Pure Gas Transactions  
($/mcf) # Obs
Ratio of Estimated Gas 
Coefficient to Pure 
Transaction ppmcf
1982 0.36 13 --- 0 ---
1983 0.64 21 1.05 1 0.61
1984 0.86 31 1.32 1 0.65
1985 0.52 34 1.34 4 0.39
1986 0.96 25 0.92 3 1.05
1987 1.02 49 0.89 5 1.15
1988 0.99 64 1.00 9 0.99
1989 0.88 99 1.18 18 0.74
1990 0.90 151 0.81 27 1.11
1991 0.87 94 0.90 18 0.96
1992 0.82 86 0.56 18 1.47
1993 0.87 115 0.77 26 1.13
1994 0.77 92 0.76 31 1.01
1995 0.60 114 0.70 31 0.87
1996 0.69 94 0.60 29 1.14
1997 0.93 67 0.90 26 1.03
1998 0.62 83 0.69 42 0.89
1999 0.67 57 0.83 24 0.82
2000 0.75 66 0.73 26 1.03
2001 1.68 52 1.55 16 1.08
2002 0.88 49 0.96 32 0.91
--- Insufficient data points.
Table B-2f: Comparisons of Natural Gas Regression Values (No Constant) with Pure Gas Values, 
Excluding Outliers
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2003
Note: The pure gas value observations are weighted volumetrically by the cubic feet in each transaction for a 
given year.  This is equivalent to summing the value of all pure transactions in a given year and dividing by the 


















Auxiliary Data and Regressions 
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Ratio         
5/6
1982 29426 2950 10.0 201730 17506 11.5
1983 27858 3020 9.2 201512 15788 12.8
1984 27735 3037 9.1 200247 17193 11.6
1985 28446 3052 9.3 197463 15985 12.4
1986 28416 2973 9.6 193369 15610 12.4
1987 26889 2873 9.4 191586 16114 11.9
1988 27256 2811 9.7 187211 16670 11.2
1989 26825 2586 10.4 168024 16983 9.9
1990 26501 2505 10.6 167116 17233 9.7
1991 26254 2512 10.5 169346 17202 9.8
1992 24682 2446 10.1 167062 17423 9.6
1993 23745 2339 10.2 165015 17789 9.3
1994 22957 2268 10.1 162415 18322 8.9
1995 22457 2213 10.1 163837 17966 9.1
1996 22351 2173 10.3 165146 18861 8.8
1997 22017 2138 10.3 166474 19211 8.7
1998 22546 1991 11.3 167233 18720 8.9
1999 21034 1952 10.8 164041 18928 8.7
2000 21765 1880 11.6 167406 19219 8.7
2001 22045 1915 11.5 177427 19779 9.0
2002 22446 2106 10.7 183460 20351 9.0
Table C-1: Proven Reserves to Production Ratios
Source: EIA/DOE "US Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquids Reserves"
Crude Oil (millions of barrels) Natural Gas (bcf)
Note: Beginning reserves indicate remaining reserves at January 1.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14



















1982 7.13 4.02 --- --- 0.36 1.54 --- --- 0.72 13 13 13 13
1983 5.84 0.10 -2.47 -0.04 0.64 25.51 --- --- 0.99 21 20 20 21
1984 3.50 4.72 3.47 4.71 2.05 0.47 -0.94 -0.22 0.99 31 31 31 33
1985 -3.28 -0.04 12.46 0.16 1.38 2.51 -1.05 -1.76 0.89 34 32 32 32
1986 6.94 1.07 -1.82 -0.28 1.19 3.85 -0.24 -0.76 0.99 25 24 24 25
1987 4.44 1.06 -0.68 -0.16 0.80 3.83 0.33 1.42 0.92 49 41 41 44
1988 5.50 41.66 2.76 6.28 1.02 46.41 -0.25 -5.45 0.99 64 55 55 56
1989 5.15 2.94 -0.02 -0.01 1.02 16.29 -0.50 -4.62 0.85 99 85 87 89
1990 4.58 1.33 -0.96 -0.28 0.82 14.41 0.10 1.49 0.94 151 142 146 149
1991 4.33 18.84 0.47 1.09 0.79 7.22 0.08 0.70 0.96 94 80 81 89
1992 4.18 10.23 0.08 0.13 0.78 9.34 0.11 0.90 0.89 86 57 63 67
1993 3.57 12.15 -0.57 -0.97 0.81 29.57 0.19 3.91 0.95 115 74 84 81
1994 3.14 12.81 -0.64 -1.38 0.79 24.20 -0.26 -2.38 0.91 92 53 63 55
1995 3.93 28.77 -1.20 -2.63 0.66 22.35 -0.07 -1.76 0.95 114 78 90 85
1996 4.01 14.34 -1.58 -2.53 0.74 16.77 -0.15 -1.83 0.87 94 57 67 63
1997 3.56 4.45 1.86 2.09 0.90 11.46 0.07 0.70 0.93 67 46 53 53
1998 1.81 5.21 3.01 5.00 0.80 13.77 -0.27 -3.85 0.87 83 46 68 54
1999 3.79 8.19 -0.56 -0.30 0.58 13.11 0.25 3.50 0.90 57 26 43 30
2000 6.02 3.10 -3.32 -1.48 0.77 11.06 -0.10 -0.83 0.74 66 29 50 34
2001 4.42 4.77 1.75 1.09 1.76 18.68 -0.42 -2.07 0.95 52 28 45 36
2002 5.55 9.19 0.23 0.34 1.06 9.48 -0.21 -1.77 0.95 49 27 47 36
--- Insufficient data points.
Note: Reserve status - whether reserves are on production or not.
Equation Specification:
where:
adjprice is transaction price (after elimination of non reserve assets)
the 'o' superscript denotes oil
the 'g' superscript denotes gas
a1 and a2 are the two coefficients for each reserve being tested
R denotes reserves sold
D denotes dummy variable for reserves on production
Oil ($/bbl) Natural Gas ($/mcf)





oo RDaaRDaaadjprice ][][ 2121 +++=
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Year a1 t-stat a2 t-stat a1 t-stat a2 t-stat
Adjusted 
R 2 Obs
1982 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1983 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1984 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1985 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1986 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1987 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1988 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1989 11.00 3.35 -1.64 -2.00 0.80 4.30 0.03 1.17 0.97 17
1990 4.95 2.57 -0.39 -0.61 1.08 24.70 -0.04 -6.22 0.99 14
1991 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1992 3.81 4.40 0.07 0.33 1.05 7.29 -0.08 -2.37 0.93 32
1993 3.85 10.11 -0.06 -1.15 1.21 20.16 -0.09 -7.22 0.97 46
1994 2.31 3.44 0.22 1.43 1.08 7.16 -0.07 -1.97 0.93 42
1995 5.00 7.57 -0.29 -1.66 0.72 8.49 -0.01 -0.77 0.97 42
1996 4.55 11.16 -0.01 -2.95 0.86 5.72 -0.02 -0.91 0.89 41
1997 5.00 5.35 -0.29 -1.73 0.93 25.56 0.00 -0.28 0.98 24
1998 5.68 8.14 -0.29 -5.62 1.06 13.96 -0.04 -2.97 0.95 42
1999 4.71 2.30 -0.16 -0.46 0.58 3.20 0.00 -0.03 0.86 32
2000 11.53 3.15 -0.66 -1.44 0.95 10.68 -0.03 -2.92 0.88 37
2001 3.22 1.49 0.16 0.36 2.47 17.12 -0.18 -5.76 0.96 32
2002 10.33 7.96 -0.99 -3.75 1.45 8.31 -0.08 -2.44 0.97 27
--- Insufficient data points.
Equation Specification:
where:
adjprice is transaction price (after elimination of non reserve assets)
the 'o' superscript denotes oil
the 'g' superscript denotes gas
a1 and a2 are the two coefficients for each reserve being tested
R denotes reserves sold
H denotes the R/P ratio
R/P ratio is the ratio of remaining reserves to annual production.
Table C-3: Regression Results for Transactions with Information on R/P Ratios (No Constant), Excluding 
Outliers
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Year Field Price Reserve Price
Ratio         
3/2 Field Price Reserve Price
Ratio         
6/5
1982 28.52 7.13 0.250 2.46 0.36 0.145
1983 26.19 3.37 0.129 2.59 0.64 0.248
1984 25.88 6.95 0.268 2.66 0.86 0.325
1985 24.09 7.74 0.321 2.51 0.52 0.208
1986 12.51 5.10 0.408 1.94 0.96 0.497
1987 15.40 4.40 0.286 1.67 1.02 0.613
1988 12.58 5.69 0.452 1.69 0.99 0.583
1989 15.86 4.61 0.291 1.69 0.88 0.519
1990 20.03 3.64 0.182 1.71 0.90 0.526
1991 16.54 4.44 0.268 1.64 0.87 0.530
1992 15.99 4.14 0.259 1.74 0.82 0.473
1993 14.25 3.54 0.248 2.04 0.87 0.428
1994 13.19 2.90 0.220 1.85 0.77 0.415
1995 14.62 3.81 0.261 1.55 0.60 0.390
1996 18.46 3.67 0.199 2.17 0.69 0.317
1997 17.23 5.01 0.291 2.32 0.93 0.401
1998 10.87 2.85 0.262 1.96 0.62 0.315
1999 15.56 3.59 0.231 2.19 0.67 0.308
2000 26.72 3.55 0.133 3.69 0.75 0.203
2001 21.84 4.21 0.193 4.12 1.68 0.407
2002 22.51 5.74 0.255 2.95 0.88 0.298
Table C-4: Oil and Natural Gas Reserve and Field Prices
Source: EIA/DOE "Monthly Energy Review" June 2003
Oil ($/bbl) Natural Gas ($/mcf)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Constant t-stat Coeff t-stat Adj. R 2 Obs
Oil Contemporary Price ($/bbl) 2.34 2.31 0.12 2.31 0.18 21
Gas Contempory Price ($/mcf) 0.53 2.76 0.13 1.61 0.07 21
Oil 1 Period Lag Price ($/bbl) 2.35 2.50 0.11 2.33 0.19 20
Gas 1 Period Lag Price ($/mcf) 0.55 3.05 0.14 1.75 0.10 20
Oil 2 Period Lag Price ($/bbl) 1.77 2.12 0.15 3.41 0.37 19
Gas 2 Period Lag Price ($/mcf) 0.84 3.44 0.01 0.06 -0.06 19
Oil Contemporary Price ($/bbl) 4.43 15.24 -0.05 -0.79 -0.02 20
Gas Contempory Price ($/mcf) 0.85 15.27 0.03 0.25 -0.05 20
Oil 1 Period Lag Price ($/bbl) 4.50 14.71 -0.01 -0.23 -0.06 19
Gas 1 Period Lag Price ($/mcf) 0.83 18.08 0.34 3.28 0.35 19
Oil 2 Period Lag Price ($/bbl) 4.37 15.18 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 18
Gas 2 Period Lag Price ($/mcf) 0.86 14.03 -0.04 -0.28 -0.06 18
Table C-5: Regression Results: Reserve Prices and Field Prices
Reserve Prices Against First Differences in Field Prices


















Hotelling Values, Implicit Price Expectations and Returns to Holding 
.


































1982 0.10 0.09 7.13 0.78 9.98 28.52 0.12 18.54 2.60 14.7
1983 0.11 0.10 3.37 0.08 9.17 26.19 -0.17 17.02 5.05 161.4
1984 0.11 0.10 6.95 0.04 9.06 25.88 0.11 16.82 2.42 252.1
1985 0.11 0.10 7.74 4.66 8.43 24.09 0.11 15.66 2.02 1.7
1986 0.10 0.09 5.10 0.77 4.38 12.51 0.10 8.13 1.59 4.0
1987 0.11 0.10 4.40 0.68 5.39 15.40 0.05 10.01 2.27 8.3
1988 0.10 0.09 5.69 0.25 4.40 12.58 0.14 8.18 1.44 10.0
1989 0.10 0.09 4.61 1.30 5.55 15.86 0.06 10.31 2.23 4.4
1990 0.09 0.09 3.64 0.40 7.01 20.03 -0.05 13.02 3.58 23.4
1991 0.10 0.09 4.44 0.36 5.79 16.54 0.03 10.75 2.42 17.6
1992 0.10 0.09 4.14 0.60 5.60 15.99 0.01 10.39 2.51 10.5
1993 0.10 0.09 3.54 0.24 4.99 14.25 -0.03 9.26 2.62 24.3
1994 0.10 0.09 2.90 0.67 4.62 13.19 -0.03 8.57 2.96 8.5
1995 0.10 0.09 3.81 0.23 5.12 14.62 0.00 9.50 2.49 25.2
1996 0.10 0.09 3.67 0.92 6.46 18.46 -0.07 12.00 3.27 9.0
1997 0.10 0.09 5.01 0.35 6.03 17.23 0.02 11.20 2.24 17.6
1998 0.09 0.08 2.85 0.90 3.80 10.87 -0.01 7.07 2.48 4.7
1999 0.09 0.08 3.59 0.57 5.45 15.56 -0.04 10.11 2.82 11.5
2000 0.09 0.08 3.55 1.81 9.35 26.72 -0.19 17.37 4.89 7.6
2001 0.09 0.08 4.21 0.88 7.64 21.84 -0.09 14.20 3.37 11.3
2002 0.09 0.09 5.74 0.56 7.88 22.51 -0.04 14.63 2.55 15.8











Net Field Price, p-c, Column (7) - Column (6).
HV to Reserve Price, Column (9) / Column (4).
HV Spread: Standard Deviations, [Column (9) - Column (4)] / Column (5).
Reserve Price (b), Table B-2a, Col 3.
Operating Cost (c), 35% of field price.
Field Price (p), Table C-4.
Implicit Annual Growth Rate in Price, see text.
Regression Results.
Table D-1: Estimates of Hotelling Values and Price Expectations, Oil
Sources:
Production/Reserves Ratio, P/R, Table C-1.
Adjusted Ratio (a), see text.
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1982 0.10 0.09 7.11 --- 9.98 28.52 0.12 18.54 2.61 ---
1983 0.11 0.10 10.15 3.38 9.17 26.19 0.16 17.02 1.68 2.0
1984 0.11 0.10 6.94 0.47 9.06 25.88 0.11 16.82 2.43 21.0
1985 0.11 0.10 3.39 2.24 8.43 24.09 -0.13 15.66 4.62 5.5
1986 0.10 0.09 8.86 1.95 4.38 12.51 0.16 8.13 0.92 -0.4
1987 0.11 0.10 3.56 2.03 5.39 15.40 -0.01 10.01 2.81 3.2
1988 0.10 0.09 6.15 1.62 4.40 12.58 0.15 8.18 1.33 1.3
1989 0.10 0.09 4.72 1.50 5.55 15.86 0.07 10.31 2.19 3.7
1990 0.09 0.09 4.22 1.71 7.01 20.03 -0.01 13.02 3.08 5.2
1991 0.10 0.09 4.66 1.89 5.79 16.54 0.04 10.75 2.31 3.2
1992 0.10 0.09 3.46 1.59 5.60 15.99 -0.04 10.39 3.01 4.4
1993 0.10 0.09 3.70 2.01 4.99 14.25 -0.02 9.26 2.50 2.8
1994 0.10 0.09 3.71 2.93 4.62 13.19 0.02 8.57 2.31 1.7
1995 0.10 0.09 3.63 1.45 5.12 14.62 -0.01 9.50 2.62 4.1
1996 0.10 0.09 3.84 2.09 6.46 18.46 -0.06 12.00 3.12 3.9
1997 0.10 0.09 4.81 2.60 6.03 17.23 0.01 11.20 2.33 2.5
1998 0.09 0.08 3.34 1.87 3.80 10.87 0.02 7.07 2.11 2.0
1999 0.09 0.08 4.22 1.71 5.45 15.56 0.00 10.11 2.40 3.4
2000 0.09 0.08 3.46 2.26 9.35 26.72 -0.20 17.37 5.02 6.1
2001 0.09 0.08 3.88 1.35 7.64 21.84 -0.11 14.20 3.66 7.6
2002 0.09 0.09 5.19 2.08 7.88 22.51 -0.06 14.63 2.82 4.5
--- Insufficient data points.











Implicit Annual Growth Rate in Price, see text.
Net Field Price, p-c, Column (7) - Column (6).
HV to Reserve Price, Column (9) / Column (4).
HV Spread: Standard Deviations, [Column (9) - Column (4)] / Column (5).
Reserve Price (b), Table B-2e, Col 4.
Operating Cost (c), 35% of field price.
Field Price (p), Table C-4.
Table D-2: Estimates of Hotelling Values and Price Expectations, Pure Oil
Sources:
Production/Reserves Ratio, P/R, Table C-1.






































1982 0.09 0.08 0.36 0.28 0.86 2.46 -0.02 1.60 4.48 4.4
1983 0.08 0.07 0.64 0.01 0.91 2.59 0.10 1.68 2.62 95.5
1984 0.09 0.08 0.86 0.00 0.93 2.66 0.17 1.73 2.00 173.7
1985 0.08 0.07 0.52 0.50 0.88 2.51 0.05 1.63 3.12 2.2
1986 0.08 0.07 0.96 0.05 0.68 1.94 0.13 1.26 1.31 6.3
1987 0.08 0.08 1.02 0.15 0.58 1.67 0.16 1.09 1.06 0.4
1988 0.09 0.08 0.99 0.03 0.59 1.69 0.17 1.10 1.11 3.8
1989 0.10 0.09 0.88 0.15 0.59 1.69 0.15 1.10 1.25 1.5
1990 0.10 0.09 0.90 0.06 0.60 1.71 0.15 1.11 1.24 3.7
1991 0.10 0.09 0.87 0.03 0.57 1.64 0.14 1.07 1.23 6.7
1992 0.10 0.09 0.82 0.07 0.61 1.74 0.11 1.13 1.37 4.3
1993 0.11 0.10 0.87 0.06 0.71 2.04 0.07 1.33 1.52 7.0
1994 0.11 0.10 0.77 0.04 0.65 1.85 0.08 1.20 1.57 11.1
1995 0.11 0.10 0.60 0.06 0.54 1.55 0.07 1.01 1.67 6.6
1996 0.11 0.10 0.69 0.04 0.76 2.17 0.02 1.41 2.05 18.7
1997 0.12 0.10 0.93 0.06 0.81 2.32 0.06 1.51 1.62 9.6
1998 0.11 0.10 0.62 0.10 0.69 1.96 0.00 1.27 2.06 6.7
1999 0.12 0.10 0.67 0.09 0.77 2.19 0.00 1.42 2.11 8.2
2000 0.11 0.10 0.75 0.12 1.29 3.69 -0.10 2.40 3.21 13.6
2001 0.11 0.10 1.68 0.17 1.44 4.12 0.04 2.68 1.60 5.8
2002 0.11 0.10 0.88 0.09 1.03 2.95 -0.02 1.92 2.18 11.5











Net Field Price, p-c, Column (7) - Column (6).
HV to Reserve Price, Column (9) / Column (4).
HV Spread: Standard Deviations, [Column (9) - Column (4)] / Column (5).
Reserve Price (b), Table B-2a, Col 5.
Operating Cost (c), 35% of field price.
Field Price (p), Table C-4.
Implicit Annual Growth Rate in Price, see text.
Regression Results.
Table D-3: Estimates of Hotelling Values and Price Expectations, Natural Gas
Sources:
Production/Reserves Ratio, P/R, Table C-1.
Adjusted Ratio (a), see text.
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1982 0.09 0.08 --- --- 0.86 2.46 --- 1.60 --- ---
1983 0.08 0.07 1.05 --- 0.91 2.59 0.18 1.68 1.61 ---
1984 0.09 0.08 1.32 --- 0.93 2.66 0.23 1.73 1.31 ---
1985 0.08 0.07 1.34 11.01 0.88 2.51 0.20 1.63 1.22 0.0
1986 0.08 0.07 0.92 0.18 0.68 1.94 0.13 1.26 1.37 1.9
1987 0.08 0.08 0.89 0.34 0.58 1.67 0.15 1.09 1.22 0.6
1988 0.09 0.08 1.00 0.27 0.59 1.69 0.17 1.10 1.10 0.4
1989 0.10 0.09 1.18 0.59 0.59 1.69 0.18 1.10 0.93 -0.1
1990 0.10 0.09 0.81 0.29 0.60 1.71 0.14 1.11 1.37 1.0
1991 0.10 0.09 0.90 0.35 0.57 1.64 0.14 1.07 1.18 0.5
1992 0.10 0.09 0.56 0.21 0.61 1.74 0.04 1.13 2.02 2.7
1993 0.11 0.10 0.77 0.28 0.71 2.04 0.05 1.33 1.71 2.0
1994 0.11 0.10 0.76 0.34 0.65 1.85 0.08 1.20 1.58 1.3
1995 0.11 0.10 0.70 0.24 0.54 1.55 0.09 1.01 1.45 1.3
1996 0.11 0.10 0.60 0.17 0.76 2.17 -0.01 1.41 2.35 4.6
1997 0.12 0.10 0.90 0.33 0.81 2.32 0.06 1.51 1.68 1.8
1998 0.11 0.10 0.69 0.29 0.69 1.96 0.02 1.27 1.85 2.0
1999 0.12 0.10 0.83 0.60 0.77 2.19 0.04 1.42 1.72 1.0
2000 0.11 0.10 0.73 0.48 1.29 3.69 -0.11 2.40 3.29 3.5
2001 0.11 0.10 1.55 0.56 1.44 4.12 0.03 2.68 1.73 2.0
2002 0.11 0.10 0.96 0.51 1.03 2.95 -0.01 1.92 1.99 1.9
--- Insufficient data points.











Net Field Price, p-c, Column (7) - Column (6).
HV to Reserve Price, Column (9) / Column (4).
HV Spread: Standard Deviations, [Column (9) - Column (4)] / Column (5).
Reserve Price (b), Table B-2f, Col 4.
Operating Cost (c), 35% of field price.
Field Price (p), Table C-4.
Implicit Annual Growth Rate in Price, see text.
Statistical Results.
Table D-4: Estimates of Hotelling Values and Price Expectations, Pure Natural Gas
Sources:
Production/Reserves Ratio, P/R, Table C-1.
Adjusted Ratio (a), see text.
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1 2 3 4 5 6
Year
Implicit Annual 
Growth Rate in 
Price (g) Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound
1982 0.12 0.05 0.16 0.06 0.17
1983 -0.17 -0.20 -0.15 -0.19 -0.14
1984 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
1985 0.11 -2.42 0.22 -0.12 0.35
1986 0.10 0.03 0.13 0.05 0.14
1987 0.05 -0.05 0.10 -0.02 0.11
1988 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.15
1989 0.06 -0.19 0.13 -0.05 0.17
1990 -0.05 -0.14 0.01 -0.12 0.02
1991 0.03 -0.01 0.06 0.00 0.07
1992 0.01 -0.09 0.06 -0.06 0.07
1993 -0.03 -1.29 0.00 -0.06 0.00
1994 -0.03 -0.26 0.05 -0.15 0.09
1995 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.03
1996 -0.07 -0.36 0.03 -0.21 0.07
1997 0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.05
1998 -0.01 -0.36 0.06 -0.14 0.11
1999 -0.04 -0.15 0.02 -0.12 0.04
2000 -0.19 -2.29 0.01 -0.58 0.21
2001 -0.09 -0.28 -0.01 -0.20 0.02
2002 -0.04 -0.09 0.00 -0.08 0.00







The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2003
Table D-5: Confidence Limits for Implicit Growth Rate of Oil Prices
Variance of V Method Delta Method
Implicit Annual Growth Rate in Price, Table D-1, Col 8.
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1 2 3 4 5 6
Year
Implicit Annual 
Growth Rate in 
Price (g) Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound
1982 -0.02 -0.93 0.20 -0.58 0.55
1983 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11
1984 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
1985 0.05 -0.93 0.21 -0.39 0.50
1986 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.14
1987 0.16 0.13 0.18 0.14 0.19
1988 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17
1989 0.15 0.09 0.18 0.11 0.19
1990 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.16
1991 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14
1992 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.13
1993 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.09
1994 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.10
1995 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.10
1996 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05
1997 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.09
1998 0.00 -0.10 0.05 -0.07 0.06
1999 0.00 -0.08 0.05 -0.06 0.06
2000 -0.10 -0.26 -0.02 -0.21 0.00
2001 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.07
2002 -0.02 -0.08 0.01 -0.07 0.02







Implicit Annual Growth Rate in Price, Table D-3, Col 8.
The Scotia Group M&A Database, January 2003
Table D-6: Confidence Limits for Implicit Growth Rate of Natural Gas Prices
Variance of V Method Delta Method
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year
Riskless 





















1983 0.096 3.37 -0.527 -0.623 0.64 0.800 0.704 0.111
1984 0.109 6.95 1.061 0.952 0.86 0.345 0.236 0.125
1985 0.084 7.74 0.114 0.030 0.52 -0.395 -0.479 0.106
1986 0.065 5.10 -0.341 -0.406 0.96 0.843 0.779 0.077
1987 0.068 4.40 -0.136 -0.204 1.02 0.062 -0.005 0.084
1988 0.077 5.69 0.292 0.215 0.99 -0.038 -0.114 0.089
1989 0.085 4.61 -0.189 -0.274 0.88 -0.111 -0.196 0.085
1990 0.079 3.64 -0.211 -0.290 0.90 0.026 -0.053 0.086
1991 0.059 4.44 0.219 0.160 0.87 -0.033 -0.092 0.079
1992 0.039 4.14 -0.067 -0.106 0.82 -0.054 -0.093 0.070
1993 0.034 3.54 -0.145 -0.179 0.87 0.060 0.026 0.059
1994 0.053 2.90 -0.180 -0.234 0.77 -0.121 -0.174 0.071
1995 0.059 3.81 0.315 0.255 0.60 -0.213 -0.272 0.066
1996 0.055 3.67 -0.036 -0.091 0.69 0.138 0.082 0.064
1997 0.056 5.01 0.362 0.306 0.93 0.356 0.300 0.064
1998 0.051 2.85 -0.431 -0.482 0.62 -0.337 -0.388 0.053
1999 0.051 3.59 0.260 0.209 0.67 0.092 0.041 0.057
2000 0.061 3.55 -0.010 -0.071 0.75 0.110 0.049 0.060
2001 0.035 4.21 0.185 0.150 1.68 1.241 1.206 0.050
2002 0.020 5.74 0.364 0.344 0.88 -0.476 -0.496 0.046
Mean 0.062 0.045 -0.017 0.115 0.053 0.075
St.Dev. 0.022 0.358 0.356 0.429 0.427 0.021
St.Err. 0.005 0.080 0.080 0.096 0.095 0.005
Mn/Se 12.578 0.560 -0.213 1.197 0.556 15.975
Sources:
(2) Federal Reserve Board Historical Rates (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/a/tcm1y.txt)
(3) Oil Reserve Price, Table B-2a, Col 3.
(4) Percentage Change, Col 3 (t)/Col 3 (t-1) - 1
(5) Oil Achieved Risk Premium, Col 4 - Col 2
(6) Natural Gas Reserve Price, Table B-2a, Col 5.
(7) Percentage Change, Col 8 (t)/Col 8 (t-1) - 1
(8) Natural Gas Achieved Risk Premium, Col 8 - Col 2
(9) Required Risk Premium, LTBR (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/a/tcm10y.txt)
Table D-7: Return to Holding Oil and Natural Gas, 1982-2002
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